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Reprogramming Recidivism: The First Step Act and 
Algorithmic Prediction of Risk 
Amy B. Cyphert 
The First Step Act, a seemingly miraculous bipartisan criminal justice 
reform bill, was signed into law in late 2018.  The Act directed the Attorney 
General to develop a risk and needs assessment tool that would effectively 
determine who would be eligible for early release based on an algorithmic 
prediction of recidivism.  The resulting tool—PATTERN—was released in 
the summer of 2019 and quickly updated in January of 2020.  It was 
immediately put to use in an unexpected manner, helping to determine 
who was eligible for early release during the COVID-19 pandemic.  It is 
now the latest in a growing list of algorithmic recidivism prediction tools, 
tools that first came to mainstream notice with critical reporting about 
the COMPAS sentencing algorithm.  
This Article evaluates PATTERN, both in its development as well as 
its still-evolving implementation.  In some ways, the PATTERN algorithm 
represents tentative steps in the right direction on issues like 
transparency, public input, and use of dynamic factors.  But PATTERN, like 
many algorithmic decision-making tools, will have a disproportionate 
impact on Black inmates; it provides fewer opportunities for inmates to 
reduce their risk score than it claims and is still shrouded in some secrecy 
due to the government’s decision to dismiss repeated calls to release more 
information about it.  Perhaps most perplexing, it is unclear whether the 
tool actually advances accuracy with its predictions.  This Article 
concludes that PATTERN is a decent first step, but it still has a long way to 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On December 21, 2018, President Trump signed into law the 
federal First Step Act,1 a sweeping piece of criminal justice reform 
legislation.  It has been one of his favorite accomplishments to tout, and 
he discussed it during the 2020 State of the Union address.2  The scope 
of the Act was broad, addressing topics ranging from reducing racial 
disparities in incarceration to shackling of pregnant inmates during 
birth.  The Act was supported overwhelmingly by Democrats and 
Republicans and heralded as “almost miraculous”3 and “a major win for 
the movement to end mass incarceration.”4  That Congress passed ANY 
criminal justice reform was, in and of itself, remarkable—it had been 
eight years since Congress had passed legislation on the topic, and even 
that was relatively modest.5  The First Step Act’s passage was further 
surprising given the administration at the time.  There had been no 
suggestion that criminal justice reform was a priority for the Trump 
Administration,6 and indeed, the last meaningful criminal justice reform 
 
 1 See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). 
 2 Matthew Charles, who President Trump described during the State of the Union 
as “the very first person to be released from prison under the First Step Act,” attended 
the speech as a guest.  Mariah Timms, President Trump: ‘Welcome Home’ to Matthew 
Charles, Man Released from Nashville Prison Under First Step Act, TENNESSEAN (Feb. 5, 
2019, 8:37 PM), https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2019/02/05/donald-
trump-state-of-the-union-matthew-charles-alice-johnson-first-step-act-free/27835
45002.  
 3 Shon Hopwood, The Effort to Reform the Federal Criminal Justice System, 128 YALE 
L.J.F. 791, 795 (2019). 
 4 Ames Grawert & Tim Lau, How the FIRST STEP Act Became Law—And What 
Happens Next, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/
blog/how-first-step-act-became-law-and-what-happens-next.  
 5 The Fair Sentencing Reform Act of 2010 reduced the crack versus powder cocaine 
disparity by increasing the amount of crack cocaine needed to trigger mandatory 
minimum sentencing from five grams to twenty-eight grams.  Fair Sentencing Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 21 and 28 U.S.C.).  Many commentators have argued that the Fair Sentencing 
Reform Act did not adequately address the crack-to-powder disparity.  See, e.g., Scott R. 
Hechinger, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Antidote to Congress’s One-Way Criminal Law 
Ratchet?, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 408, 449 (2011) (“After the FSA’s passage, some 
argued that the bill did not go far enough in equalizing the sentences imposed for crack 
and powder cocaine offenses.  Others complained that the bill did not apply 
retroactively, thus leaving those individuals sentenced for crack-based offenses prior to 
the FSA’s enactment without relief.”).  The First Step Act addresses the retroactive 
application in Title IV. 
 6 See, e.g., Grawert & Lau, supra note 4, at 2 (“[W]hen Donald Trump was elected 
president in 2016, many worried that sentencing reform would prove impossible for the 
next four years.  Trump’s position on criminal justice reform was unclear at best and 
regressive at worse.”); Hopwood, supra note 3, at 797 (“After the 2016 election and the 
appointment of Senator Jeff Sessions as Attorney General, most in the federal reform 
community believed we would spend the next four years playing defense against the 
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proposed legislation had been blocked by none other than the Attorney 
General, Jeff Sessions, while he was in the Senate.7 
The First Step Act embodied important prison reform goals, 
including reducing the use of restraints on pregnant inmates;8 
addressing the crack versus cocaine sentencing disparity;9 improving 
reentry programs for those leaving prison;10 and streamlining the 
process for placing incarcerated persons in prisons near their families.11  
Given the breadth and importance of these initiatives, it is not surprising 
that many criminal justice reform groups supported the Act’s passage.12  
As of December 2019, 7,000 incarcerated persons had been released 
under this Act.13  
In the First Step Act, Congress directed the Attorney General to 
develop a risk and needs assessment tool that could facilitate reducing 
recidivism and would prioritize the early release of any inmates14 who 
were found to pose a “minimum” or “low” risk of reoffending.  As a 
 
DOJ’s bad policy preferences and a Congress that frequently treats criminal law and 
punishment as the only way to fix national social problems.”). 
 7 See Ames C. Grawert, Analysis: Sen. Jeff Sessions’s Record on Criminal Justice, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/
research-reports/analysis-sen-jeff-sessionss-record-criminal-justice (noting that then-
Senator Sessions had “personally blocked” a bipartisan criminal justice reform effort in 
2016). 
 8 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 301, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018) 
(prohibiting the use of restraints on inmates “during the period of pregnancy, labor, and 
postpartum recovery” unless the inmate is a “flight risk”; poses a threat of harm to 
herself or others; or the restraints are appropriate for the inmate’s medical safety) 
 9 See First Step Act § 404 (allowing courts to retroactively apply the Fair Sentencing 
Reform Act of 2010). 
 10 First Step Act §§ 502–05 (providing federal grants for the improvement of existing 
adult and juvenile reentry programs and the development of additional reentry 
programs).  
 11 First Step Act § 601 (“[T]he Bureau of Prisons [shall] place the prisoner as close 
as practicable to the prisoner’s primary residence, and to the extent practicable, in a 
facility within 500 driving miles of that residence.”). 
 12 Brandon L. Garrett, Federal Criminal Risk Assessment, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 133 
(2019) (“A wide range of civil rights groups such as the National Urban League, the 
American Civil Liberties Union, #cut50, as well as conservative groups . . . praised the 
legislation.”). 
 13 Rachel Anspach, How the First Step Act Got People Out of Prison and Back with 
Their Families, MIC (Dec. 24, 2019), https://www.mic.com/p/how-the-first-step-act-
got-people-out-of-prison-back-with-their-families-19629720.   
 14 In this Article, I use the terms “inmate” and “prisoner” to refer to people who are 
currently incarcerated.  In past scholarship, I have used the term I prefer, “incarcerated 
person.”  See, e.g., Amy B. Cyphert, Prisoners of Fate: The Challenges of Creating Change 
for Children of Incarcerated Parents, 77 MD. L. REV. 385 (2018).  Here, I use the terms 
“inmate” and “prisoner” for the sake of consistency and clarity because they are the 
terms used throughout both the First Step Act and the subsequent DOJ reports 
announcing and clarifying the PATTERN tool. 
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result, the Department of Justice (DOJ) worked with outside consultants 
to develop an algorithmic assessment tool, PATTERN, to classify each 
federal inmate as being minimum, low, medium, or high risk of 
reoffending.  This Article examines PATTERN, contextualizing it 
historically in the evolution of recidivism prediction tools as well as 
assessing where it represents advances in the field and where it is 
problematic.  
Part II of this Article traces the history of recidivism prediction 
practices, starting with early clinical models wherein judges and 
probation officials used their experience to assess the likelihood an 
individual would reoffend.  The historical overview then moves into 
today’s sophisticated algorithmic models, many of which are fueled by 
machine learning.  This new field of algorithms has been attacked as 
opaque, shielded in secrecy, and racially biased.  The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court’s recent decision concerning the recidivism prediction 
algorithm COMPAS—and the backlash it sparked—offers a lens into 
how courts treat these tools. 
Part III then discusses the First Step Act, and specifically, the 
requirements therein that a risk and needs assessment tool be 
developed.  Congress was specific about certain features, requiring, for 
example, that the tool be objective and statistically validated,15 publicly 
released, and quickly developed.16  Congress was silent, however, about 
other features such as where to set the risk-level cutoffs, how to define 
recidivism, and how to assess accuracy.  Congress’s silence on those 
topics was a de facto delegation of several critical policy decisions to the 
Attorney General, who in turn delegated those policy decisions to the 
outside consultants hired to develop PATTERN.  
Part IV is the heart of the Article, outlining and dissecting 
PATTERN’s incomplete progress toward better recidivism prediction.  
This Article attempts to give credit where credit is due, acknowledging 
the places where DOJ has made attempts at important goals like 
transparency, public input, and best practices in tool design.  But 
PATTERN still falls short in each of those areas and others, and DOJ 
needs to do more as it continues to update and calibrate PATTERN.  For 
example, although DOJ has provided some important transparency with 
respect to PATTERN, the dataset that was used to train the algorithm 
must be publicly released to allow for independent verification of the 
DOJ’s claims about the tool’s accuracy and lack of bias.  Further, the 
Department must continue to listen to the community and other 
 
 15 First Step Act § 101(a) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A)). 
 16 Id. 
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stakeholders and be responsive to the consistent and informed criticism 
it has received about things like how to properly evaluate PATTERN’s 
accuracy and how to address racial bias.  This is especially important 
given that PATTERN is being used to determine which inmates are 
eligible for early release during the COVID-19 pandemic,17 which has 
disproportionately impacted Black Americans.18  Further, the decision 
to prioritize the risk assessment over the needs assessment reduces 
PATTERN’s ability to reward inmates for participating in programming, 
which is an evidence-based way to reduce recidivism.  
There are things to laud in the First Step Act, and PATTERN’s risk 
predictions may offer some inmates an opportunity for early release and 
reunification with their families.  To ensure this opportunity is fairly 
apportioned, PATTERN must be rigorously evaluated, and DOJ needs to 
do more to allow that to happen. 
II.  HISTORY OF RECIDIVISM PREDICTION 
A.  Evolution from Clinical Models to Actuarial Models 
Although the use of algorithms fueled by machine learning may be 
relatively new to the criminal justice world, predicting how likely a 
criminal defendant or inmate is to reoffend is not a new phenomenon.  
Judges, probation professionals, and correctional staff have long used a 
variety of tools, including their own intuition, to assess the likelihood 
that a person would reoffend.  In the early part of the twentieth century, 
under what has been termed the “clinical model” of risk assessment,19 
correctional staff and clinical professionals, such as psychiatrists and 
social workers, played a prominent role in determining “who required 
 
 17 In a March 26, 2020, letter to BOP officials, Attorney General Bill Barr directed the 
BOP to prioritize the use of granting home confinement to certain inmates in light of the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  Attorney General Barr indicated that decisions about who was 
eligible for home confinement should include an examination of factors such as inmate 
age and vulnerability, as well as “[t]he inmate’s score under PATTERN, with inmates 
who have anything above a minimum score not receiving priority treatment.”  
Memorandum from Bill Barr, Attorney General, to Bureau of Prisons Officials (Mar. 26, 
2020). 
 18 The CDC has acknowledged that early data regarding the COVID-19 pandemic 
provides increasing evidence that “some racial and ethnic minority groups are being 
disproportionately affected by COVID-19.”  Health Equity Considerations and Racial and 
Ethnic Minority Groups, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/health-equity/race-ethnicity.html (last updated 
July 24, 2020). 
 19 Alyssa M. Carlson, The Need for Transparency in the Age of Predictive Sentencing 
Algorithms, 103 IOWA L. REV. 303, 305 (2017) (“In the clinical model, assessments to 
evaluate a defendant are either made by mental health experts or other actors in the 
criminal justice system, such as judges or parole boards.”). 
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enhanced security and supervision,”20 and thus who should have a 
longer carceral sentence.  
In the 1970s, “there was a growing recognition that the assessment 
of risk needed to depend more upon actuarial, evidence-based science 
and less on professional judgement.”21  Actuarial risk assessment 
systems were developed to attempt to provide a more objective 
approach to predicting recidivism.  These early actuarial risk 
assessments examined which factors were most likely to be statistically 
associated with reoffending—such as a history of substance abuse—and 
assigned points to inmates who presented with those factors.22  The 
higher the point total, the higher, in theory, the risk that a person would 
reoffend (and therefore the longer the carceral sentence).  One major 
shortcoming was that these early models focused mostly on the types of 
static, historical data that was easily available to corrections 
professionals at the time, namely, criminal history information.23  
Because these early models were based on historical data, there was no 
opportunity for an individual to improve his or her score through 
activities, such as education courses or substance abuse treatment.  
Simply put, the early actuarial models did not “account for offenders 
changing for the better.”24 
In response, researchers began in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
to develop new actuarial models that took into account dynamic 
features such as employment while incarcerated and family 
relationships.25  These newer tools were called “risk-need assessments” 
because they looked not only at the risk that a person would reoffend 
but also at the needs they might have to reduce their likelihood of 
 
 20 James Bonta & D.A. Andrews, Risk-Need-Responsivity Model for Offender 
Assessment and Rehabilitation 2006–07, PUBLIC SAFETY CANADA 3 (2007), 
https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/rsk-nd-rspnsvty/rsk-nd-rspnsvty-
eng.pdf (noting that these professionals were “[g]uided by their own professional 
training and experience,” and that the “assessment of risk was a matter of professional 
judgement”). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. (“Actuarial risk assessment instruments consider individual items (e.g., history 
of substance abuse) that have been demonstrated to increase the risk of reoffending and 
assign these items quantitative scores.”). 
 23 Id. (“The items that create these instruments are chosen simply because they are 
easily available and show an association with recidivism.  The items are not chosen 
because they are theoretically relevant. Thus, the majority of the items are criminal 
history items—the type of information that correctional systems are quite efficient at 
collecting and distributing.”).  
 24 Id. at 4. 
 25 Id. 
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reoffending.26  Having information about inmates’ needs helped 
corrections staff appropriately identify the kinds of interventions 
inmates required to help reduce their recidivism risk.27  This risk and 
needs model is still with us today (and indeed was required by the First 
Step Act), but advances in technology have changed the tools’ level of 
sophistication and complication. 
B.  Modern Risk Assessment Tools 
1.  Machine Learning Algorithms 
Today’s modern risk assessment tools, including PATTERN, 
continue to address both risk and needs.  As of 2015, over sixty different 
risk assessment tools were used in the sentencing context alone,28 and 
more were used for bail determinations and by corrections officials.  A 
2010 Vera Institute for Justice survey found that “[a]lmost every state 
uses an assessment tool at one or more points in the criminal justice 
system,” and that “over 60 community supervision agencies in 41 states 
reported using an actuarial assessment tool.”29 
Many of today’s tools are algorithms that are fueled by machine 
learning, which allows them to consider many more factors than ever 
before and to also more closely examine the myriad ways in which those 
factors might interact with each other.30  “Machine learning is an 
umbrella term to describe a special subset of algorithms wherein a 
computer is programmed to revise the code it is using as it works, based 
 
 26 Bonta & Andrews, supra note 20, at 4 (noting that these new risk-need models 
“were sensitive to changes in an offender’s circumstances and also provided 
correctional staff with information as to what needs should be targeted in their 
interventions”).  
 27 Id. 
 28 Aziz Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043, 1075 
(2019); see also Carlson, supra note 19, at 309. 
 29 Memorandum from the Vera Inst. of Justice, Ctr. on Sentencing & Corr. to Illinois 
Risk, Assets and Needs Assessment Task Force 6, 1 (May 27, 2010), 
https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/Documents/National_Information_Offender_Assessme
nts_PartII_Memo.pdf; see also Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System: Risk Assessment 
Tools, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/crim-
justice (last visited Aug. 23, 2020) (noting that algorithmic recidivism prediction tools 
are used in nearly every state).  
 30 Danielle Kehl, Priscilla Guo, and Samuel Kessler, Algorithms in the Criminal Justice 
System: Assessing the Use of Risk Assessments in Sentencing 9 (2017) (unpublished 
student work available through Responsive Communities Initiative, Berkman Klein 
Center for Internet & Society, Harvard Law School) (on file with Digital Access to 
Scholarship at Harvard), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33746041 (“A 
number of modern risk-assessment tools take advantage of machine learning 
algorithms, which generate risk models based on vast quantities of data.  As these 
algorithms are used over time, their models often dynamically adjust to new data.”).  
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on the results it is generating.”31  Put simply, the machine is 
programmed to perform certain tasks, “learns” from the results it is 
seeing, and updates its code accordingly.  Because the computer is 
revising the code, often in real time and perhaps thousands of times, 
people refer to machine learning algorithms as “black boxes” because 
the developers cannot easily explain why the algorithm produces the 
outputs it does, even when they know the inputs.32 
One of the most commonly used tools today is Correctional 
Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS).  
COMPAS’s developers describe it as a “web-based tool designed to 
assess offenders’ criminogenic needs and risk of recidivism.”33  COMPAS 
makes its predictions based on data it compiles in a 137-question 
evaluation, with questions ranging from “[d]o you feel that the things 
you do are boring or dull?” to “[i]f people make me angry or lose my 
temper, I can be dangerous.”34  The public widely criticized COMPAS, 
which the software company Northpointe developed, after May 2016 
reporting by ProPublica revealed that Black defendants were 77% more 
likely to be labeled as a higher risk of committing a future violent crime 
than white defendants.35  
 
 31 Amy B. Cyphert, Tinker-ing with Machine Learning: The Legality and Consequences 
of Online Surveillance of Students, 20 NEV. L.J. 457, 461 (2020). 
 32 See, e.g., Oversight Hearing on the Federal Bureau of Prisons and Implementation of 
the First Step Act Before the Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing] (statement 
of David E. Patton, Exec. Director, Fed. Defenders of New York) (“[A]cross risk 
assessments in criminal justice, the secrecy that permeates black box instruments 
causes significant concerns about how reasonable they are in practice.”); Joshua A. Kroll 
et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 638 (2017) (“Machine learning, one 
increasingly popular approach to automated decisionmaking, is particularly ill-suited to 
source code analysis because it involves situations where the decisional rule itself 
emerges automatically from the specific data under analysis, sometimes in ways that no 
human can explain.”); Han-Wei Liu, Ching-Fu Lin &  Yu-Jie Chen, Beyond State v. Loomis: 
Artificial Intelligence, Government Algorithmization, and Accountability, 27 INT’L J.L. & 
INFO. TECH. 122, 135 (2019) (noting that the black box problems cannot be resolved by 
enacting transparency requirements because “[t]he technical nature of AI techniques is 
characterized by an inherent lack of transparency,” with even the programmers unable 
to explain why and how certain determinations are made).  But see Cyphert, supra  
note 31, at 479 (acknowledging that machine learning algorithms can be shrouded in 
mystery but that there are none the less “several stages in the machine learning process 
where humans are making decisions and where safeguards can help control against 
bias.”). 
 33 Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 
52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 239 (2015) (quoting NORTHPOINTE, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO 
COMPAS 1 (2013)). 
 34 Carlson, supra note 19, at 310–11. 
 35 Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.pro
publica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing.  In 
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2.  State v. Loomis 
In a high-profile and landmark opinion,36 the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court examined the use of the COMPAS tool.  Eric Loomis pleaded guilty 
to attempting to flee a traffic officer and operating a motor vehicle 
without the owner’s consent.37  The court ordered a presentence 
investigation, and the “Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) included 
an attached COMPAS risk assessment.”38  Mr. Loomis’s COMPAS risk 
scores “indicated that he presented a high risk of recidivism” across all 
three of the risk areas COMPAS purports to assess: pretrial recidivism 
risk, general recidivism risk, and violent recidivism risk.39  The State 
relied on the COMPAS scores during its arguments at sentencing,40 and 
the sentencing judge relied on the COMPAS scores in ruling out 
probation for Mr. Loomis.41  The court sentenced Mr. Loomis to six years 
of confinement.42  
After his initial sentencing hearing, Mr. “Loomis filed a motion for 
post-conviction relief requesting a new sentencing hearing,” arguing 
among other things that the sentencing court’s use of COMPAS in 
crafting his sentence had violated his due process rights.43  At a 
subsequent hearing, an expert witness testified that “consideration at 
sentencing of the risk assessment portions of COMPAS runs a 
‘tremendous risk of over estimating an individual’s risk and . . . 
 
response, Northpointe sent ProPublica a letter, wherein it “criticized ProPublica’s 
methodology and defended the accuracy of its test: ‘Northpointe does not agree that the 
results of your analysis, or the claims being made based upon that analysis, are correct 
or that they accurately reflect the outcomes from the application of the model.’”  Id.  For 
more about the fallout from the ProPublica article, see Cyphert, supra note 31,  
at 465–67. 
 36 See Kehl et al., supra note 30, at 20 (describing the Loomis opinion as “a landmark 
decision,” and noting that “it was the first time a U.S. court evaluated these algorithms 
head on”).  
 37 State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 754 (Wis. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2290 
(2017). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 754–55. 
 40 Id. at 755.  Specifically, the prosecutor said at sentencing that “the COMPAS report 
that was completed in this case does show the high risk and the high needs of the 
defendant.  There’s a high risk of violence, high risk of recidivism, high pre-trial risk; and 
so all of these are factors in determining the appropriate sentence.”  Id. 
 41 Id. at 755.  The Judge first noted that Mr. Loomis had been identified, “through the 
COMPAS assessment, as an individual who is at high risk to the community.”  Id.  He went 
on to add that “I’m ruling out probation because of the seriousness of the crime and 
because your history, your history on supervision, and the risk assessment tools that have 
been utilized, suggest that you’re extremely high risk to re-offend.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 42 Id. at 756 n.18 (noting that Loomis had been sentenced to two years incarceration 
on one count and four years incarceration on another, to be served consecutively).  
 43 Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 756. 
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mistakenly sentencing them or basing their sentence on factors that 
may not apply.’”44  Mr. Loomis’s expert witness further pointed out that 
the court was missing key information about COMPAS, including what 
dataset was used to develop it.45  The judge denied the post-conviction 
motion, explaining that he “would have imposed the same sentence 
regardless of whether [he] considered the COMPAS risk scores.”46 
On appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Mr. Loomis argued that 
his due process rights had been violated because the algorithm used by 
COMPAS was given trade secret protection and so “the proprietary 
nature of COMPAS prevent[ed] him from assessing its accuracy.”47  In 
rejecting that argument, the Wisconsin Supreme Court placed great 
weight on the fact that COMPAS used only publicly available information 
in formulating a risk score, and therefore Mr. Loomis had an opportunity 
to verify the information.48  The fact that Mr. Loomis had no idea how 
much weight, if any, the COMPAS tool provided to any of those 
individual factors was not enough, under the court’s ruling, to create a 
due process violation, but many scholars have disagreed with this 
conclusion.49  “Simply put, Loomis may have seen the input and output 
[of COMPAS], but had no idea of [those inputs’] relationship,”50 
information that would have been crucial for him to vigorously 
challenge his risk classification.51  The United States Supreme Court 
declined to hear Mr. Loomis’s appeal of the Wisconsin court’s decision,52 
so the decision and its problematic holdings remain law in the state of 
 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 756–57.  The expert testified that “[t]he Court does not know how the 
COMPAS compares that individual’s history with the population that it’s comparing 
them with. The Court doesn’t even know whether that population is a Wisconsin 
population, a New York population, a California population . . . . There’s all kinds of 
information that the court doesn’t have, and what we’re doing is we’re mis-informing 
the court when we put these graphs in front of them and let them use it for sentence.” 
 46 Id. at 757. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 761.  The Court held that “to the extent that Loomis’s risk assessment [was] 
based upon his answers to questions and publicly available data about his criminal 
history, Loomis had the opportunity to verify that the questions and answers listed on 
the COMPAS report were accurate.”  Id. 
 49 See, e.g., Han-Wei Liu et al., supra note 32, at 132 (“While COMPAS algorithms 
drew on public data and information provided by Loomis, it did not explain the 
breakdown of each variable, relevant weighting and their correlation.”). 
 50 Id. at 133. 
 51 See Kehl et al., supra note 30, at 28 (noting that many scholars have expressed 
“broad concerns” about how inputs “are weighted by the algorithm, and . . . whether 
specific factors (or combinations of factors) may end up serving as proxies for 
problematic or impermissible variables like race and poverty”).   
 52 Loomis v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017).  
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Wisconsin and remain influential as the most well-known example of a 
court examining recidivism prediction algorithms.  
It is worth noting that the Wisconsin Supreme Court did provide 
parameters and cautions in the Loomis decision that are especially 
noteworthy given PATTERN’s role in determining who is eligible for 
early release.  The Loomis court held that that COMPAS scores could not 
be used: “(1) to determine whether an offender is incarcerated; [ ] (2) to 
determine the severity of the sentence,” or (3) “as the determinative 
factor in deciding whether an offender can be supervised safely and 
effectively in the community.”53  In contrast, PATTERN is the only tool 
that will determine the risk category where an inmate is placed.  As is 
discussed in Part IV, it is unclear whether there will be any meaningful 
opportunity for an inmate to challenge his or her PATTERN score.  
Further, unlike COMPAS, PATTERN is not just one factor that is weighed 
in deciding who is eligible for benefits like early release, it is THE factor.  
Thus, PATTERN is in certain, important ways more influential than 
COMPAS in determining how long an inmate is incarcerated. 
III.  PATTERN: THE RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT TOOL 
A.  The First Step Act’s Charge to the Attorney General 
In Title I of the First Step Act, Congress delegated to the Attorney 
General54 the task of developing and implementing a risk and needs 
assessment system.55  The Act’s language encouraged the Attorney 
General to consider algorithmic decision-making, defining the risk and 
needs system as “an objective and statistically validated method” which 
determines the risk of recidivism.56  The Act does not require the 
reinvention of the wheel; in developing the risk and needs assessment 
system, it allows the Attorney General to use existing risk and needs 
 
 53 State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 769 (Wis. 2016). 
 54 The Act provides that the Attorney General work in consultation with several 
others, namely the Director of the Bureau of Prisons; the Director of the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts; the Director of the Office of Probation and Pretrial 
Services; the Director of the National Institute of Justice; the Director of the National 
Institute of Corrections; and an Independent Review Committee authorized by the Act.  
First Step Act § 101(a) (2018).  
 55 The Department of Justice has defined risks versus needs as follows: “Whereas 
risk refers to an inmate’s statistical propensity for recidivism or some other adverse 
outcome, needs represents the areas of intervention that must be addressed to mitigate 
the risk of recidivism.”  U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 
2018: RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT SYSTEM 28 (2019) [hereinafter FIRST STEP ACT REPORT] 
https://nij.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh171/files/media/document/the-first-step-act-
of-2018-risk-and-needs-assessment-system_1.pdf. 
 56 First Step Act § 101(a) (emphasis added). 
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assessment tools.57  As its name suggests, the risk and needs assessment 
tool has twin aims: each inmate is assigned a risk of recidivism category 
and also assessed for any needs they may have to minimize their risk of 
recidivism. 
With respect to risk, the Act charged the Attorney General with 
developing a tool to “determine the recidivism risk of each prisoner as 
part of the intake process, and classify each prisoner as having 
minimum, low, medium, or high risk for recidivism.”58  It did not provide 
any guidance on where to set those cutoffs.  The stakes of the 
assessment are high, as inmates assigned a recidivism risk of 
“minimum” or “low” are eligible to earn additional time credits toward 
early release59 as well as home confinement.60  Further, the Act directed 
that “prisoners with a similar risk level be grouped together in housing 
and assignment decisions to the extent practicable.”61  There were also 
additional incentives for participation in the recidivism reduction 
programming, including increased phone and visitation privileges,62 
“increased commissary spending limits and product offerings,”63 and 
additional “opportunities to access the email system.”64  The Act 
required that the assessment be dynamic, capable of changing over time 
as inmates either progress or regress.65 
 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id.  The “recidivism” the system assessed was specifically “the risk of violent or 
serious misconduct of each prisoner[.]”  Id. § 3632(a)(2).   
 59 Id.  All eligible inmates are able to earn 10 days of time credits for every 30 days 
they participate in the recidivism reduction programs; those who are classified as 
“minimum” or “low” risk for recidivating, earn an additional 5 days of time credits.  Id. 
 60 Id. § 602.  Section 602 of the First Step Act amends 18 U.S.C. 3624(c)(2) by adding: 
“The Bureau of Prisons shall, to the extent practicable, place prisoners with lower risk 
levels and lower needs on home confinement for the maximum amount of time 
permitted under this paragraph.”  Id. 
 61 Id. § 101(a). 
 62 First Step Act § 101(a). 
A prisoner who is successfully participating in an evidence-based 
recidivism reduction program shall receive [ ] phone privileges, or, if 
available, video conferencing privileges, for up to 30 minutes per day, 
and up to 510 minutes per month; and [ ] additional time for 
visitation at the prison, as determined by the warden of the prison. 
Id.  Contact with family while a person is incarcerated has been shown to be one factor 
in reducing recidivism, especially for incarcerated parents.  See Amy B. Cyphert, 
Prisoners of Fate: The Challenges of Creating Change for Children of Incarcerated Parents, 
77 MD. L. REV. 385, 394–96 (2018) 
 63 First Step Act § 101(a). 
 64 Id. 
 65 First Step Act § 101(a) required that the BOP’s tool “reassess the recidivism risk 
of each prisoner periodically, based on factors including indicators of progress, and of 
regression, that are dynamic and that can reasonably be expected to change while in 
prison[.]”  Id.  
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Congress did not stop at charging the Attorney General with 
developing a tool to determine and categorize risk.  The Act also 
required a needs assessment for each inmate, which would result in a 
tailored determination of the recidivism reduction programming 
and/or productive activities that would best help to reduce that 
person’s likelihood of reoffending upon release from prison.66  The Act 
defined “evidence-based recidivism reduction program” as “a group or 
individual activity that [ ] has been shown by empirical evidence to 
reduce recidivism or is based on research indicating that it is likely to 
be effective in reducing recidivism[.]”67  These programs may include a 
wide variety of topics and approaches, ranging from “social learning and 
communication, interpersonal, anti-bullying, rejection response, and 
other life skills”68 to vocational training.69  The Act defined “productive 
activities” somewhat circularly as activities that allow inmates to 
remain productive and maintain a low risk of recidivating.70  The Act 
required that those labeled with a higher risk of reoffending be given 
priority access to recidivism reduction programs, and that those 
classified as lower risk for reoffending be given priority access to 
productive activities.71  The Attorney General was also directed to 
review existing evidence-based recidivism programs and productive 
activities, identifying which were most effective and coordinating with 
the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) about them.72   
 
 66 Id. (requiring that the Attorney General “determine the type and amount of 
evidence-based recidivism reduction programming that is appropriate for each prisoner 
and assign each prisoner to such programming accordingly, and based on the prisoner’s 
specific criminogenic needs”).  With respect to “criminogenic needs,” the First Step Act 
Report announcing the creation of the PATTERN tool notes: “Although research varies 
about how each of these needs is linked to recidivism risk, criminal thinking, antisocial 
peers, substance abuse, and education and vocational needs typically are identified as 
important criminogenic needs.”  FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 29. 
 67 First Step Act § 101(a). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id.  Other topics include academic classes, mentoring, and substance abuse 
treatment. Id. 
 70 Id.  The Act defines a “productive activity” as: 
[E]ither a group or individual activity that is designed to allow 
prisoners determined as having a minimum or low risk of 
recidivating to remain productive and thereby maintain a minimum 
or low risk of recidivating, and may include the delivery of the 
programs described in paragraph (1) to other prisoners. 
 Id. 
 71 The Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 3621(h)(6) as follows: “Priority for participation in 
recidivism reduction programs shall be given to medium-risk and high-risk prisoners, 
with access to productive activities given to minimum-risk and low-risk prisoners.”  
First Step Act § 102.  
 72 First Step Act § 101(a). 
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B.  The Development of PATTERN 
The Act had an ambitious timeline, providing only 210 days from 
the date of its passage until the risk and needs assessment system 
needed to be developed and publicly released.73  Further, certain tasks 
had to be completed prior to the release of the system, including the 
Attorney General’s review of existing recidivism programs and 
corresponding direction to BOP about them.74  On July 19, 2019, exactly 
209 days after the passage of the First Step Act, Attorney General 
William Barr publicly released the Prisoner Assessment Tool Targeting 
Estimated Risks and Needs, or “PATTERN.”  Two outside experts, Dr. 
Grant Duwe and Dr. Zachary Hamilton, designed PATTERN,75 both 
having previously developed risk and needs assessment programs.76  
Dr. Duwe and Dr. Hamilton participated in three listening sessions 
the DOJ hosted during PATTERN’s development “to enable experts, 
stakeholders—including organizations representing crime victims—
and public interest organizations to comment” on its development.77  
They also participated in conference calls with the constituent groups 
with whom the Act required the Attorney General to collaborate: the 
BOP, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), and the Independent Review 
Committee.78  Further, after the original public release of the tool in June 
of 2019, the DOJ continued to host listening sessions and gather 
feedback in a 45-day public comment period.79  On January 15, 2020, the 
DOJ released a report announcing certain updates to the PATTERN tool, 
 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 12. 
 76 Id. at 13.  Dr. Duwe has developed four separate risk assessment instruments, 
including the Minnesota Screening Tool Assessing Recidivism Risk.  Id.  Dr. Hamilton has 
developed several risk-need assessment systems for adults and juveniles in the states of 
Delaware, Iowa, Nebraska, Tennessee, and Washington.  Id. 
 77 Id. at 14. 
 78 Id. at 42.  The Act tasked the NIJ with choosing a nonpartisan, nonprofit 
organization with expertise in risk and needs assessment tools to host the IRC and select 
its members.  First Step Act § 107.  The NIJ selected the Hudson Institute as the host of 
the IRC.  FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 9.  The Hudson Institute then selected 
the IRC’s six members: Dr. Patti Butterfield, Dr. James M. Byrne, Dr. Faye S. Taxman, 
George J. Terwilliger III, John P. Walters, and John E. Wetzel.  Id. at 10–12; see also 
Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of John P. Walters, Member, First Step Act 
Independent Review Committee) (“The Independent Review Committee is composed of 
six experts from a range of fields and with extensive expertise in both research and 
operations.”).  For more on the qualifications of the IRC members, see First Step Act 
sections 107(c) and 107(d); see also infra note 225.   
 79 See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018: 
RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT SYSTEM—UPDATE 3 (January 2020) [hereinafter UPDATED 
REPORT].  
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updates that the Department said were made “as a direct result of the 
input and suggestions” received during the public comment period.80  
Still, DOJ announced more changes to the tool in June of 202081 after 
ProPublica exposed secret changes made in the wake of the COVID-19 
pandemic.82  These later changes to the tool are discussed at length 
below. 
In developing PATTERN, Dr. Duwe and Dr. Hamilton reviewed BOP 
data concerning 278,940 former inmates who had been released into 
the community.83  The BOP dataset tracked those who were rearrested 
within three years and excluded those who died during the three-year 
follow-up period as well as anyone scheduled for deportation.84  The 
dataset also included information on factors the DOJ described as 
“commonly associated with recidivism risk,”85 such as age at time of 
release, criminal history, and any misconduct during the time of 
incarceration.86 
Dr. Duwe and Dr. Hamilton also reviewed data from BOP’s existing 
recidivism prediction tools, BRAVO and BRAVO-R.87  BRAVO (“Bureau 
Risk Assessment Verification and Observation”), created by the BOP in 
the 1970s, “was designed to predict serious misconduct in prison.”88  
BRAVO-R (“Bureau Risk Assessment Verification and Observation-
Revised”) was “designed to address recidivism in the community,” and 
“to predict misconduct for custody-level classification purposes.”89 Dr. 
 
 80 Id. at 1. 
 81 See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, FIRST STEP ACT IMPLEMENTATION FISCAL YEAR 2020 90-DAY 
REPORT 1 (June 2, 2020) [hereinafter JUNE REPORT]. 
 82 Ian MacDougall, Bill Barr Promised to Release Prisoners Threatened by 
Coronavirus—Even as the Feds Secretly Made It Harder for Them to Get Out, PROPUBLICA 
(May 26, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/bill-barr-promised-to-
release-prisoners-threatened-by-coronavirus-even-as-the-feds-secretly-made-it-
harder-for-them-to-get-out. 
 83 The dataset included persons who had been released from BOP facilities from 
2009 to 2015.  FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 42.  “The vast majority of items 
within the dataset were drawn from SENTRY, the BOP’s centralized inmate management 
system.”  Id. at 49. 
 84 Id. at 42–43. 
 85 Id. at 43. 
 86 Id.  
 87 Id. at 12.  
 88 Id. at 12, 43. 
 89 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 12, 42.  Some advocates have questioned 
whether PATTERN is different enough from BRAVO or BRAVO-R to add meaningfully to 
current BOP recidivism prediction efforts.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFF. OF JUSTICE 
PROGRAMS, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, STAKEHOLDER STATEMENTS SUBMITTED IN RESPONSE TO NIJ’S 
FIRST STEP ACT LISTENING SESSIONS (September 2019) [hereinafter NIJ LISTENING SESSION 
STATEMENTS] (written statement of James F. Austin on behalf of the JFA Institute) (noting 
that since “either the existing BOP BRAVO-R or the proposed PATTERN would be equally 
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Duwe and Dr. Hamilton used the BOP dataset to develop and “validate” 
PATTERN;90 they used the dataset both to build the tool initially and 
then to test the tool and see what its predictive accuracy would have 
been with respect to the known data on the three-year rearrest data.91  
Part IV below addresses several outstanding questions regarding the 
specifics of how Dr. Duwe and Dr. Hamilton developed and validated 
PATTERN, including whether they used machine learning in developing 
their algorithm. 
C.  Defining Recidivism: What Does PATTERN Purport to Predict? 
PATTERN purports to predict the likelihood that a person will 
reoffend within the three years following their release from a BOP 
facility.92  Of course, as with any recidivism prediction tool, what 
PATTERN is actually attempting to predict is not the likelihood that an 
inmate will reoffend but the likelihood that they will be arrested and/or 
convicted for criminal behavior.93  PATTERN was developed to predict 
both “general recidivism” (defined as “any arrest or return to BOP 
custody following release” within a three-year period post-release) as 
well as “violent recidivism” (defined as “violent arrests following 
release” within a three-year period post-release).94  These definitions of 
recidivism have been criticized as overly broad for including minor 
technical violations, like failing to update a residence,95 though the DOJ 
 
effective [based on their AUC scores, this] raises the question of why the expense and 
time [was] spent to develop an [sic] ‘new’ instrument that is already in place”). 
 90 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 43.  
 91 Specifically, they used approximately 2/3 of the dataset as “training data” to train 
their algorithm with.  Id. at 49.  They then used the remaining approximately 1/3 of the 
dataset as “test data” to establish the accuracy of the tool.  Id. 
 92 Id. at 43. 
 93 Id. at 50.  The decisions made by recidivism prediction tool developers about 
“what counts” as recidivism at times “touches on key sentencing policy decisions often 
left undecided by state actors.”  Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY 
L.J. 59, 78 (2017) (noting that when recidivism is defined solely by arrest, the data will 
not reflect whether a person was ultimately exonerated because of an overturned 
conviction or even if the prosecutor declines to press charges).  See infra Part IV for a 
discussion of how racial disparities in policing can further bias recidivism prediction 
when recidivism is defined solely by arrest. 
 94 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 50. 
 95 Oversight Hearing, supra note 32, at 9 (“The definition the DOJ chose is unduly 
broad, sweeping in revocations for minor technical violations such as failure to timely 
report a change of residence, or failing to timely notify the probation officer of being 
questioned by police.”); see also Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (Letter from Ames C. 
Grawert to David B. Muhlhausen, NIJ Director (Sept. 3, 2019), attached to statement of 
Ames C. Grawert, Senior Counsel, Justice Program, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU 
School of Law) [hereinafter Brennan Center letter] (“PATTERN’s general tool was 
designed around a very broad definition [of recidivism]: the risk that an incarcerated 
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declined to narrow them in the revised PATTERN tool, claiming they 
lacked the data necessary to do so.96  The terms have also been criticized 
as too vague for not including a definition of which infractions are 
deemed “violent.”97  In the Updated Report, the DOJ clarified that the 
terms “general recidivism” and “violent recidivism” mirror the 
definitions used by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and provided more 
precise definitions and illustrative examples.98 
In addition to dividing recidivism into “general” and “violent” 
categories, PATTERN also subdivides depending on the gender of the 
person being examined.  The tool’s developers argue that “adding both 
gender and outcome (i.e., general and violent recidivism) specificity” 
represents “recent advancements in risk assessment tool construction” 
over earlier tools such as BRAVO-R.99  To capture gender-specific risk 
metrics, men and women were separated into individual samples and a 
different algorithm was created for each.100  
 
person would face a ‘new arrest or return to BOP custody within three years of 
release.’”).  
 96 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 13.  The DOJ also argued in the Updated Report 
that it saw benefits in retaining the old definitions, including to allow BOP to “more 
accurately measure how well a program is working” and to facilitate “comparisons 
across risk assessment and criminal justice systems.”  Id. at 14. 
 97 Oversight Hearing, supra note 32, Ex. A at 10 (“More information is needed here, 
as well, regarding what kinds of arrests are considered ‘violent.’”).  
 98 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 12.  Specifically, DOJ provided that: 
General recidivism is defined as a return to BOP custody or a re-
arrest within three years of release from BOP custody, excluding all 
traffic offenses except driving under the influence (DUI) and driving 
while intoxicated (DWI).  Violent recidivism is defined as a re-arrest 
for a suspected act of violence within three years of release from BOP 
custody.  Examples of the violent offenses captured in this definition 
include, but are not limited to, firearms violations, homicide, child 
abuse, robbery, sex trafficking, and sexual assault. 
Id. at 12–13. 
 99 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 44.  This decision to separate men from 
women when making recidivism predictions may well improve the accuracy of the tool 
for both groups, given the disparate rates of violence.  “When base rates of the predicted 
outcome differ across groups, the most accurate algorithm possible will predict that 
outcome at different rates across groups.”  Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE 
L.J. 2218, 2249 (2019).  Gender-neutral risk assessment tools tend to have an adverse 
effect on women by overestimating their risk of recidivism.  See Sharad Goel et al., The 
Accuracy, Equity, and Jurisprudence of Criminal Risk Assessment 9 (Dec. 26, 2018) 
(unpublished article), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3306723.  PATTERN has been 
criticized, however, for using different algorithms to assess men and women.  See 
UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 16 (noting that the DOJ had received feedback that 
“PATTERN’s separate modelling for men and women raises constitutional concerns”). 
 100 See FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 49 (“Gender-responsive risk metrics 
are developed by separating males and females into individual samples to produce 
gender-specific prediction models, which improves both the context and accuracy of 
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D.  Risk Factors and Risk Levels 
In making its predictions, the PATTERN tool takes into account 
factors that are dynamic (things an inmate can change, like participation 
in education classes while incarcerated) as well as static (historical 
things that are unchangeable, such as the inmate’s age at arrest).101  The 
use of both dynamic and static factors is considered a best practice,102 
and indeed Congress mandated the use of both in the First Step Act.103  
Examples of dynamic factors that PATTERN relies on in making its 
predictions include an inmate’s participation in drug education and 
treatment programs, participation in employment, and use of the 
income earned from that employment for payment toward victim 
restitution and/or dependents.104  Examples of static factors included in 
the original PATTERN tool are age at first conviction, whether the crime 
was “violent,” and whether the inmate was identified as a “sex 
offender.”105 
PATTERN’s inclusion of dynamic factors is noteworthy.  As the 
DOJ’s own report remarked, some research suggests that a predictive 
tool’s potential for racial bias is lowered when dynamic factors are 
included.106  Prior risk prediction tools utilized the “Burgess method,” 
wherein each predictive factor was equally weighted,107 but the 
PATTERN tool analytically weights the dynamic and static factors it 
uses.108  It appears that the DOJ has publicly released the weights that 
 
prediction.”).  Males represented approximately 85% of the training and data samples, 
and females the remaining 15%.  Id. 
 101 Id. at 43. 
Static factors are characteristics of inmates that are historical and 
therefore unchangeable, such as offense severity, age at first arrest, 
and criminal history at prison entry.  By contrast, dynamic factors are 
variables that may change over time and may reflect more recent 
inmate behavior, such as prison misconduct or substance abuse. 
Id. at 26. 
 102 Id. 
 103 See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 101, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018) 
(requiring that the BOP’s tool “reassess the recidivism risk of each prisoner periodically, 
based on factors including indicators of progress, and of regression, that are dynamic 
and that can reasonably be expected to change while in prison”).  
 104 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 45. 
 105 Id. at 45–46. 
 106 Id. at 60. 
 107 The “Burgess method,” developed by Professor Ernest Burgess in 1927, used 21 
factors to determine an individual’s likelihood of recidivism while on parole.  The 
“Burgess method” was one of the first risk assessment methods to be developed.  
Carlson, supra note 19, at 308. 
 108 “Based on findings of previous studies, analytically weighting assessment items 
improves predictive accuracy, and this was the method adopted for PATTERN.”  FIRST 
STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 50.  
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PATTERN assigns to each of the predictive factors.  The First Step Act 
Report included a Table entitled “Points Assigned in the PATTERN Risk 
Assessment Models,”109 and noted that “[l]arger values indicate greater 
prediction strength for a given model.”110  Several advocates expressed 
confusion about whether the points in that Table represented the final 
and sole weighing of the factors.111  (Understanding the weights 
assigned to the various predictive factors used in any prediction tool is, 
of course, important to analyzing it.)112  In response, the Updated Report 
clarified that “[e]ach individual’s response scores are summed to 
compute a total score.”113 
The PATTERN developers also had to decide where to place the 
“cut-off points” that would define, as the Act required, the risk-level 
categories of “high,” “medium,” “low,” or “minimum.”114  The DOJ has 
acknowledged that there are “several known methods” for determining 
such cutoff points, most using statistics.115  Even though sophisticated 
statistics may be used to help determine cutoffs in a predictive 
algorithm like PATTERN, the fact remains that the decisions about 
where to place the cutoffs are best described as “a matter of policy, not 
math,”116 and some scholars have argued that such important policy 
 
 109 Id. at 53–56.  
 110 Id. at 53.  The Report also explained that “boosted regression models were 
computed for each of the four models, with selected items and weights created from 
model coefficients. Coefficient values for each model were converted (multiplied by 
100) to whole numbers to improve ease of risk scoring.”  Id. at 66. 
 111 See, e.g., Oversight Hearing, supra note 32, Ex. A at 9 (letter from David E. Patton, 
Exec. Director, Fed. Defenders of New York to David Muhlhausen, Director of Nat’l Inst. 
of Justice, attached to statement of David E. Patton, Executive Director, Federal 
Defenders of New York) (“The DOJ Report indicates that PATTERN involves ‘analytically 
weighting assessment items,’ but more information is needed on whether the weights 
are assigned solely through the points identified for each of the factors included in Table 
2, or are somehow reweighted in an algorithm not discussed in the report.”).   
 112 Eaglin, supra note 93, at 73. Tool creators generally use one of two statistical 
methods to weigh assessment factors.  One statistical method assigns every factor equal 
weight.  The other statistical method assigns different weight to assessment factors 
depending on how predictive each factor may be.  Id. at 81.  
 113 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 37. 
 114 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 101, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). 
 115 See FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 50.  
 116 Chelsea Barabas et al., An Open Letter to the Members of the Massachusetts 
Legislature Regarding the Adoption of Actuarial Risk Assessment Tools in the Criminal 
Justice System, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y 1, 4 (Nov. 9, 2017), 
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:34372582 (“By way of example, the 
classification of a risk category applicable to a particular criminal defendant with 
respect to a given risk score (e.g., high risk, medium risk, or low risk) is a matter of policy, 
not math.”). 
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decisions should not be left to predictive tool developers.117  PATTERN’s 
developers set the cutoffs for its risk-level categories by basing them, in 
part, on BOP base rates for general and violent recidivism,118 a decision 
that has been criticized as “arbitrary.”119  
In May of 2020, ProPublica published an article reporting that the 
DOJ had quietly lowered the PATTERN risk-level cutoffs without making 
any public acknowledgment of doing so, making it harder for inmates to 
be classified as “minimum” risk, and had used the new risk-level cutoffs 
in determining which inmates were eligible for early release during the 
COVID-19 pandemic.120  A week later, the DOJ released a fiscal report 
where it acknowledged the new, lower risk-level cutoffs.121  Ultimately, 
to be classified as “low” or “minimum” risk and therefore be eligible for 
early release and other benefits, an inmate must be classified as “low” 
or “minimum” risk in both the general and violent recidivism prediction 
models.122  
 
 117 See, e.g., Eaglin, supra note 93, at 59 (“Government agencies should always decide 
the cut-off points.”).  Indeed, the First Step Act Report acknowledged that the choice of 
cutoff points is in some ways a policy decision.  
The current cut points endeavor to set the appropriate balance 
between maximizing the number of inmates eligible to earn early 
release time credits and to participate in evidence-based 
programming that would reduce their recidivism risk to a low or 
minimum category, while also considering public safety and the risk 
of recidivism upon release. 
FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 51. 
 118 Id.  
Specifically, the low risk threshold was set at roughly half the base 
rate (or 24 percent) for general recidivism and just over two-thirds 
the base rate for violent recidivism (or 12 percent).  The minimum 
risk category was set at just under one-quarter of the base rate (or 
10 percent) for general recidivism and one-third of the base rate for 
violent recidivism (or 5 percent).  The high risk category was set at 
roughly two-thirds above the base rate (or 80 percent) for general 
recidivism, and just over twice the base rate (or 33 percent) for 
violent recidivism. 
Id.  Anyone not identified as minimum, low, or high risk was, by default, classified as 
medium risk.  Id.  “This specific set of cut-off points was one of nearly a dozen” cutoff 
points that were tested by the PATTERN developers.  Id.   
 119 Oversight Hearing, supra note 32, Ex. A at 16 (letter attached to statement of David 
E. Patton, Exec. Director, Fed. Defenders of New York) (“For example, the decisions on 
the cut-points, which necessarily impact fairness measures such as false positive rates 
and positive predictive values, appear to have been made by the researchers and based 
on arbitrary fractions or multiples of the recidivism rates.”). 
 120 MacDougall, supra note 82. 
 121 JUNE REPORT, supra note 81, at 2. 
 122 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 51. 
The four categories were created for both general and violent 
recidivism risk scores.  A final set of categories was created where an 
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PATTERN’s developers “analyzed” the impact of the initial risk-
level cutoff points based on an inmate’s race and/or ethnicity by 
creating a relative risk index.  This index compares the proportion of 
individuals from racial or ethnic groups across the sample to the 
proportion of individuals from those same groups within the risk 
levels.123  The First Step Act Report provides the results of the relative 
risk index at Tables 8, 9, and 10, but does not discuss them.124  Scholars 
who have examined those tables report that they “reflect[] racial 
disparity.”125  No information was provided in the June Report 
concerning the new, lower risk-level cutoff points or any racial 
disparities. 
E.  Assessing PATTERN’s Accuracy 
Having developed their tool using the BOP data, PATTERN’s 
developers tested it to determine its predictive validity.  They chose to 
use a statistical method known as “area under curve” or “AUC.”126  At the 
risk of oversimplifying what is an “an inherently difficult concept,”127 
AUC is essentially a measure of how well a predictive tool performs 
when it makes the classifications it has been programmed to make.  For 
a recidivism prediction tool like PATTERN, AUC is best thought of as a 
measure of how often the tool correctly assigned a higher risk level to 
someone who reoffended than it did to someone who did not 
 
individual must be identified as minimum risk of both general and 
violent recidivism to be classified as minimum in the final RLCs.  An 
individual that was identified as lower than medium risk in both the 
general and violent models was labeled as low risk in the final RLC.  
Those individuals identified as high risk in either the general or 
violent models were classified as high risk in the final RLCs.  Finally, 
those not classified as minimum, low, or high risk were identified as 
medium risk in the final RLCs. 
Id. 
 123 Id. at 53.  The results of this relative risk index are displayed in Tables 8–10 of the 
FIRST STEP ACT REPORT.  Id. at 62. 
 124 Id. at 62. 
 125 Oversight Hearing, supra note 32, at 12 (statement of Prof. Melissa Hamilton).  
Professor Hamilton notes that “[a]n RRI over 1.0 indicates disparity between groups,” 
and that Table 8 of the First Step Act Report shows an RRI of 1.54 for males.  Id.  Put 
another way, “[n]on-Whites are one-and-a-half times more likely to be assessed as 
medium/high risk than Whites” under the original PATTERN tool.  Id.  
 126 See FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 50 (“Relying on the AUC as the primary 
metric for evaluating predictive validity, the research team analyzed how the PATTERN 
instruments performed in predicting recidivism on the test set . . . .”). 
 127 Melissa Hamilton, Adventures in Risk: Predicting Violent and Sexual Recidivism in 
Sentencing Law, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 27 (2015). 
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reoffend.128  In other words, if person A reoffended and person B did not, 
and PATTERN classified person A as “high risk” and person B as 
“medium risk,” that would be counted as “accuracy” for AUC purposes.  
If the tool is correct in this classification half the time, the AUC score is 
.5.129  If the tool is correct in this classification all of the time, the AUC 
score is 1.130  Most of the recidivism prediction tools that are used today 
have AUC values that fall between .60 to .80.131 
PATTERN’s creators report that, based on its AUC value, PATTERN 
is “15% more predictive than other [recidivism prediction] tools”!132  It 
is worth noting here that although AUC is a widely used, popular method 
to assess the predictive accuracy of risk assessment tools,133 the First 
Step Act Report itself acknowledged that this method “can provide an 
overly optimistic estimate of predictive discrimination for imbalanced 
datasets.”134  According to the DOJ, PATTERN’s AUC values, which range 
from .77 to .80,135 represent a “consistent, modest improvement” over 
the predictive reliability of the BRAVO-R tool.136  PATTERN’s developers 
also analyzed the tool and its risk-level cut points via odds ratios.  The 
developers calculated that, for general recidivism, inmates labeled as 
minimum or low risk had an 86% reduced chance of recidivating as 
compared to those labeled as medium or high risk.137  For violent 
recidivism, those labeled as minimum or low risk had an 88% reduced 
 
 128 Id. at 25; see also Charlotte Hopkinson, Using Daubert to Evaluate Evidence-Based 
Sentencing, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 723, 741 (using AUC to measure “how well the predictive 
test can differentiate those who experienced the outcome of interest (labeled as likely 
to recidivate and did recidivate) versus those who did not (labeled as likely to recidivate 
but did not recidivate)”). 
 129 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 56 (“[A]n AUC of .5 means there is a 50 
percent probability that the result is accurate, which is the same as a coin toss.”).  
 130 Id. (“An AUC of 1.0 means there is a 100 percent probability in the result, which is 
essentially perfection.”); see also Hamilton, supra note 127, at 25 (“AUC values lie 
between 0 and 1, with .5 indicating discriminatory ability no better than chance and 1 
indicating perfect discrimination.”). 
 131 Eaglin, supra note 93, at n.180. 
 132 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 57 fig.3.   
 133 Id. at 37; see also Eaglin, supra note 93, at 90 (“[A] popular method to assess 
predictive accuracy measures the area under the curve, or the AUC value.”); Hamilton, 
supra note 127, at 25 (noting that “[s]everal statistical measures of discrimination for 
actuarial tools are available,” but that AUC “has come to dominate the relevant 
literature”). 
 134 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 66 n.24.  The Report goes on to note that 
AUC “is relatively robust across different recidivism base rates and selection ratios.”  Id. 
 135 Specifically, the AUC scores were calculated as follows: female violent recidivism 
at .77; female general recidivism at .79; male violent recidivism at .78; and male general 
recidivism at .8.  Id. at 57 tbl.3. 
 136 Id. at 57. 
 137 Id. at 58. 
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chance of recidivating, as compared to those labeled medium or high 
risk.138  The First Step Act Report concluded that these findings “identify 
a substantial demarcation in recidivism rates between early-release-
eligible (minimum and low) and non-eligible (medium and high) risk 
categories.”139 
DOJ also reported AUC scores for PATTERN that were broken down 
by the race/ethnicity of the inmate.  They used the four categories the 
BOP data used: white, African American, Hispanic, and other.140  The 
First Step Act Report is internally inconsistent on the presence of any 
racial bias in PATTERN.  At one point, the report concludes that the AUC 
value findings “suggest” “minimal” racial or ethnic disparity with 
respect to PATTERN’s predictive value,141 and just a few pages later the 
report says that “the PATTERN instrument’s predictive performance is 
unbiased across racial and ethnic classifications.”142  In any event, the 
AUC calculations relied on to demonstrate racial neutrality actually 
show that in both categories for male inmates (male general recidivism 
and male violent recidivism), the AUC value calculated for white inmates 
is higher than the AUC value for African American and Hispanic 
inmates.143  This means that, accepting the DOJ’s own test for predictive 
validity, PATTERN is less accurate in predicting recidivism for men of 
color than for white men.  The AUC values for white women were lower 
than the AUC values for African American women but higher than those 
of Hispanic women.144  The presence of racial bias in the PATTERN tool 
and how to minimize it is addressed in Part IV.  
 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 60. 
 141 Id. (“Overall, these findings indicate strong and comparable prediction strength 
for PATTERN models across all race/ethnicity categories, suggesting minimal 
racial/ethnic disparity for PATTERN’s prediction strength.”). 
 142 Id. at 63. 
 143 See id. at 60 tbl.7.  The AUC value for general recidivism among white men was 
calculated to be .81, as opposed to .78 for both African American and Hispanic men.  Id.  
The AUC value for violent recidivism among white men was calculated to be .80, as 
opposed to .75 for African American men and .78 for Hispanic men.  Id.   
 144 Id.  The AUC value for general recidivism among African American women was 
calculated to be .80, as opposed to .79 for white women and .76 for Hispanic women.  Id.  
The AUC value for violent recidivism among African American women was calculated to 
be .80, as opposed to .75 for both white and Hispanic women.  Id.  Professor Melissa 
Hamilton notes that even though demographic parity is better for women than men 
under PATTERN, it is still problematic and means that “African-American females 
benefit less often from the First Step Act’s incentives and rewards.”  Oversight Hearing, 
supra note 32, at 13 (statement of Prof. Melissa Hamilton). 
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IV.  PATTERN’S INCOMPLETE PROGRESS 
There are many unanswered questions about PATTERN and 
several problems with its development and the assumptions that 
underlie it.  Still, it is important to note that there are some laudable 
aspects to PATTERN, even as each is not yet sufficient.  Specifically, 
PATTERN’s development involves a level of transparency greater than 
that of private software companies (although, as is discussed in the next 
Section, still greater transparency is required); PATTERN’s commitment 
to using dynamic factors, at least in theory, is a step in the right direction 
(though its practical application is currently in doubt); the PATTERN 
developers reached out to community stakeholders and held public 
comment sessions in creating the tool; and PATTERN’s commitment to 
recalibration and continued study is an important best practice.  
Ultimately, the decision of the PATTERN developers to prioritize 
accuracy over other important policy goals, and their decision to use 
AUC as a proxy for accuracy, remain problematic. 
A.  Transparency 
With respect to transparency, it should be acknowledged that the 
DOJ has provided more information about PATTERN than many private 
software companies provide about their recidivism prediction tools.  
Northpointe’s decision to claim trade secret protection over its COMPAS 
algorithm in the Loomis case is a troubling but not isolated example.  
Indeed, one reason some academics have advocated for government-
developed algorithms is precisely to avoid such trade secret and 
proprietary claims, in the hope that government-funded software would 
be available to the public at large to inspect.145  One academic noted that 
 
 145 See, e.g., Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 2025−26 (2017) 
(citing CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY 
AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 27 (2016)) (advocating that “courts and legislatures should 
consider requiring that software used in criminal trials and sentencings be publicly 
designed and open-source,” and noting that “[p]ublic models would have the benefit of 
being ‘transparent’ and ‘continuously updated, with both the assumptions and the 
conclusions clear for all to see’”); see also Kehl et al., supra note 30, at 28 (noting that 
“[a]cademic researchers and governments, [as opposed to private software companies,] 
. . . tend to have more incentives to make the details of their algorithms publicly available 
and ensure that they are subject to appropriate scrutiny and oversight”).  It is worth 
noting that the DOJ and other government agencies have claimed trade secret protection 
over government-developed software programs.  See, e.g., Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty 
and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 
1343, 1346 (2018) (“[T]he federal government claimed that trade secret interests 
should shield details about how a cybercrime investigative software program operates 
. . . .”).  Further, “New York City’s Office of Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) argued, 
repeatedly and successfully, that the source code for a forensic software program 
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even providing the “minimal disclosures” of “information about the 
specific origin of the data set underlying a tool” and “the selection of risk 
factors”—both items the DOJ appears to have provided—would “go 
beyond what many developers currently provide.”146 
1.  Congress Mandated Certain Disclosures in the Act 
Congress mandated in the First Step Act that the Attorney General 
not only create a risk and needs assessment but further that he publicly 
release that system.147  Accordingly, the First Step Act Report provides 
the following about PATTERN: (1) some information about what the 
dataset used to develop the tool was;148 (2) what the numeric risk-level 
cutoffs are149 (though, of course, as noted above, those cutoff levels 
appear to have been changed without a timely public acknowledgment); 
(3) the factors that the tool uses in calculating an inmate’s risk score;150 
(4) the relative weight of each of those factors;151 and (5) some 
information about the relative accuracy of the tool, at least as measured 
by one technique as against other BOP recidivism prediction tools.152  
The Updated Report also offers additional information about PATTERN, 
namely which factors the PATTERN developers consider “dynamic” and 
which they consider “static.”153 
Congress also mandated in the First Step Act a certain level of 
ongoing reporting about PATTERN.  For example, the Act requires the 
Director of the Bureau of Justice Statistics to annually submit to 
Congress statistics on “[t]he breakdown of prisoners classified at each 
risk level by demographic characteristics.”154  The Act also requires that 
the Independent Review Committee submits to Congress a report 
addressing the demographic percentages of inmates ineligible to 
 
developed in-house using taxpayer funds should be protected from subpoena by 
criminal defendants.”  Id. at 1397. 
 146 Eaglin, supra note 93, at 111. 
 147 First Step Act § 3632(a) (“Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
of the FIRST STEP Act, the Attorney General shall develop and release a risk and needs 
assessment system[.]”) 
 148 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 43 (“Hamilton and Duwe used the BOP 
datasets to develop and validate” PATTERN). 
 149 Id. at 58. 
 150 Id. at 53−56.  The Updated Report also provides the factors for the updated tool.  
UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 37−39. 
 151 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 53−56.  
 152 Id. at 57.  
 153 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 10−11. 
 154 See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 610(a)(26), 132 Stat. 5194 
(2018) (requiring the annual breakdown of prisoners to include the following 
demographic characteristics: “age, sex, race, and the length of the sentence imposed”). 
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receive and apply time credits, including by age, race, and sex.155  These 
reports, provided they are publicly released, should add to the overall 
transparency of PATTERN by allowing researchers to examine them for 
indicators of bias. 
2.  Additional Transparency Is Critical 
Although these steps toward transparency are laudable, they are 
wholly insufficient.  There are several important steps that the DOJ 
should take to provide more transparency about PATTERN—
transparency that will allow advocates to truly assess the fairness of the 
system.  “Greater transparency will have little impact if outside 
researchers do not have access to the data and tools to evaluate and test 
the algorithms for bias.”156 
i.  The Dataset Used to Create PATTERN Should Be Publicly 
Released 
First, the BOP dataset used to develop PATTERN should be publicly 
released.  Several advocates and scholars—ranging across the 
ideological spectrum from the Brennan Center to the Charles Koch 
Institute—have already made this request in Congressional 
testimony157 and at NIJ listening sessions,158 and the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) has submitted a FOIA 
request for the dataset.159  The dataset is already complete, has already 
 
 155 See First Step Act § 107(g)(4) (requiring the Independent Review Committee to 
submit “recommendations regarding recidivism reduction” with its report); see also id. 
§ 103(8) (requiring the Comptroller General to conduct an audit of the use of the risk 
and needs assessment system every two years, which must include an analysis of “[t]he 
rates of recidivism among similarly classified prisoners to identify any unwarranted 
disparities, including disparities among similarly classified prisoners of different 
demographic groups, in such rates”). 
 156 Kehl et al., supra note 30, at 33. 
 157 See, e.g., Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of David E. Patton, Executive 
Director, Federal Defenders of New York) (“Full transparency requires the DOJ to 
release the same dataset used by Grant Duwe, Ph.D., and Zachary Hamilton, Ph.D., to 
create PATTERN.”); Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of Prof. Melissa 
Hamilton) (“The datasets should be public released.”). 
 158 See NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS, supra note 89 (statement of Jeremiah 
Mosteller on behalf of the Charles Koch Institute) (“[W]e strongly recommend that the 
Department of Justice allow a group of independent, external researchers to analyze the 
data used to develop the PATTERN and confirm its predictive validity before full 
implementation by the Bureau of Prisons.”). 
 159 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (written Statement of Norman Reimer, 
Executive Director of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).  The FOIA 
request, attached to the written statement, requested the dataset used to develop 
PATTERN along with an array of other information, including the model used to train 
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been provided to PATTERN’s developers, and should be relatively easy 
to produce.160  Without access to the dataset, researchers and advocates 
have to accept at face value the DOJ’s claims about PATTERN’s validity, 
accuracy, and bias.161  Further, access to the dataset would allow 
researchers to calculate other methods of accuracy beyond AUC, a 
measure that is problematic for the reasons discussed below.162 
Despite these compelling and uniform calls for release of the 
dataset, the DOJ declined in the Updated Report to do so, arguing that 
the data “is restricted because [it] . . . includes arrest and conviction 
information provided directly to DOJ by state and local jurisdictions, 
who have a significant interest in protecting their data.”163  Putting aside 
the question of how much of the PATTERN data actually comes from 
states and localities as opposed to how much is already in the 
underlying BOP dataset, as the initial report provided, the argument 
about data privacy does not withstand scrutiny.  The DOJ is essentially 
arguing that it cannot release data that is overwhelmingly publicly 
available164 and was compiled with taxpayer dollars because of data 
privacy concerns.  Further, the DOJ claims that the information is subject 
to “sharing agreements” that prohibit the release of the data.165  The DOJ 
does not provide whether states insisted on these sharing agreements 
or if the DOJ offered them as a matter of course.  The Updated Report 
even claims that anyone who accesses the data would have to have a 
background check—without providing any source for that 
 
PATTERN, clarification about certain risk factors, and information about how certain 
risk factors were weighted.  Id.  
 160 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of Prof. Melissa Hamilton) (noting 
that any datasets “have already been anonymized and delivered to the external 
PATTERN developers. Hence, there is no obvious burden to personnel or resources for 
the BOP and NIJ to publicly release these datasets.”). 
 161 See, e.g., id. (noting that with the public release of the PATTERN dataset, 
researchers would “be able to calculate a host of measures that are absent in the DOJ 
Report yet are relevant to a more holistic analysis of the validity, reliability, and equity 
of the PATTERN tool as it exists”); Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of David 
E. Patton, Executive Director, Federal Defenders of New York) (“Access to the data would 
allow independent researchers to isolate individual factors and determine which 
contributed to any disparate impact.”). 
 162 See infra Section IV.D.; see also Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of 
Prof. Melissa Hamilton) (“[T]he AUC has serious limitations and thus cannot present a 
holistic portrait of a tool’s abilities.”). 
 163 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 14.  
 164 See Eldar Haber, Digital Expungement, 77 MD. L. REV. 337, 351 (2018) (noting that 
criminal records “are generally considered public information” and that digital data 
practices make them more publicly available than ever before). 
 165 See UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 14 (“The retrieval, disclosure, and 
redistribution of that criminal history data is prohibited by the sharing agreements used 
to acquire the underlying data.”). 
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requirement—and that the expense and delay associated with 
background checks make sharing the data widely “not a feasible 
solution to increasing transparency with outside stakeholders.”166  The 
DOJ does claim it will allow an unknown number of researchers an 
opportunity to apply for the chance to conduct a five-year review of 
PATTERN’s data—subject to “appropriate background investigations, 
and permission from relevant justice agencies.”167  Ultimately, the DOJ is 
offering its own version of Northpointe’s “trade secret” defense, and it 
falls flat here as it should have in Loomis.168 
ii.  The DOJ Should Release Additional Information About the 
Development of PATTERN 
Even releasing the dataset, reticent as the DOJ is to do so, is not 
enough to allow for a full and independent evaluation of PATTERN.  The 
DOJ needs to provide some additional information about how PATTERN 
was developed.  The NACDL FOIA request seeks additional information 
beyond the dataset,169 and for good reason: this additional information 
is critical to fully assessing PATTERN.  “Full transparency” for 
algorithmic assessment purposes requires the release of items such as 
any source code.170  Further, we know that PATTERN’s developers 
tested and rejected numerous risk-level cutoffs and static and dynamic 
factors.171  Decisions about where to set risk-level cutoffs are “highly 
 
 166 Id. at 15.  
 167 Id. 
 168 The Wisconsin court’s decision to recognize any trade secret protection in Loomis 
has been widely attacked.  See, e.g., TAYLOR R. MOORE, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., TRADE 
SECRETS & ALGORITHMS AS BARRIERS TO SOCIAL JUSTICE (2017) (arguing that trade secret law 
is not properly calibrated to balance social good in situations like risk assessment and 
“that a social justice framework should be incorporated into trade secret protection 
when applied to risk-assessment algorithms”).  
 169 See supra note 159.  
 170 Kroll et al., supra note 32, at 641 (“[W]ithout full transparency—including source 
code, input data, and the full operating environment of the software—even the 
disclosure of audit logs showing what a program did while it was running provides no 
guarantee that the disclosed information actually reflects a computer system’s 
behavior.”). 
 171 See FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 51 (noting that PATTERN’s developers 
tested nearly a dozen different cut points for the risk levels before selecting one); see 
also UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 11 (“The Department analyzed more than a 
hundred different iterations and variables in order to find those factors most predictive 
of the risk of recidivism.  The process of weighting the variables was based on scientific 
research and analysis.”). 
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subjective,”172 and are matters of policy, not math.173  The decisions 
surrounding which factors to test and which to ultimately include in 
PATTERN are important policy decisions that should be made 
transparently,174 and researchers and advocates should be able to probe 
the decisions.  The DOJ needs to share information about the factor and 
risk-level testing process and why it reached the decisions it made.  This 
is especially important given the troubling decision to lower the risk-
level cutoffs in March 2020 with no public acknowledgment that the 
cutoffs were lowered until June 2020 and after investigative reporting 
by ProPublica.  The June Report does not provide any explanation for 
this decision beyond noting that “changes were made to raw scores to 
ensure that inmates were accurately placed in the appropriate Risk 
Level Category and the tool achieved the same high-level of predictive 
accuracy” that it had previously purportedly attained.175 
The DOJ also needs to disclose whether machine learning was used 
to develop the risk classification algorithm.  Although the question of 
whether machine learning was used to develop PATTERN was raised in 
Congressional testimony, there has so far been no answer from the DOJ, 
including in the Updated Report it released in January of 2020.176  If 
 
 172 See Eaglin, supra note 93, at 87 (“Translating tool outcomes into risk categories is 
a highly subjective, policy- oriented process.”).  The risk-level cutoff point decisions for 
PATTERN have been questioned.  See NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS, supra note 89 
(statement of Professor Christopher Slobogin) (“[W]hy are the high, medium, and low 
risk cut-scores in the PATTERN set relative to the population sample rather than the 
absolute probability of recidivism?  The PATTERN’s method of setting cut scores means 
that individuals with a 12% probability of committing a violent crime are considered 
medium risk (see p. 51 of the report).  A probability level that low is, at best, only 
justifiable if ‘violent crime’ is defined narrowly.”). 
 173 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (letter attached to statement of David E. 
Patton, Executive Director, Federal Defenders of New York) (“Risk assessments are not 
simply math. Every risk assessment involves moral choices and tradeoffs.”).  
 174 See Eaglin, supra note 93, at 79 (“Developers make judgment calls about what 
factors to study in a data set.”); see also NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS, supra note 89 
(written statement of Brandon L. Garrett and Megan T. Stevenson) (“The DOJ Report 
that announced the development of the PATTERN describes how the experts who 
developed it made certain key decisions concerning the risk thresholds that separate 
these groups. However, no information is provided in that Report about how those 
thresholds were set. Determining how many individuals are rated minimum or low risk, 
and therefore get the many benefits associated with this designation, is one of the most 
influential decisions pertaining to the risk assessment tool.”). 
 175 JUNE REPORT, supra note 81, at 2. 
 176 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (letter attached to statement of David E. 
Patton, Executive Director, Federal Defenders of New York) (“The DOJ Report provides 
so few details on weighting, it is unclear what type(s) of models were used (such as 
regressions) and/or whether any type of machine learning (supervised or 
unsupervised) was employed. If the former, more information is needed regarding 
whether and how stepwise procedures were used, data on intercorrelations, and if 
multicollinearity exists. If the algorithm was developed with any form of machine 
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machine learning was used to develop PATTERN (and many researchers 
theorize that most new recidivism prediction tools will take advantage 
of it),177 it could be quite difficult for even the tools’ developers to 
explain why the factors were ultimately weighed in the way they 
were.178  Ultimately, if PATTERN’s developers chose to use the more 
opaque machine learning process over the more easily explainable 
process of standard regression analysis in developing PATTERN,179 that 
is a decision they should acknowledge, because “the choice to field such 
a system instead of one which can be interpreted and governed is itself 
a decision about the system’s design.”180  Further, they should be willing 
to explain why any losses in explainability that occur as a result of using 
machine learning are offset by gains in areas such as accuracy.  In sum, 
PATTERN’s developers need to say much more about how they 
developed the tool and the policy decisions they codified in it. 
B.  Use of Dynamic Factors 
As discussed above, it is a best practice for recidivism prediction 
tools to use dynamic as well as static factors in classifying someone’s 
risk of reoffending, and DOJ officials touted PATTERN’s use of dynamic 
factors in testimony before Congress.181  PATTERN’s use of dynamic 
factors is problematic, however, because it undervalues them in the 
algorithm compared to static factors and because the BOP cannot 
presently support all of the programs in which an inmate would need to 
participate to meaningfully reduce his or her score. 
 
learning, this more ‘black box’ method has different and profound implications on 
transparency of the developmental procedures.”). 
 177 See, e.g., Huq, supra note 28, at 1067−68 (“Not all such tools use machine learning 
or deep learning.  But it is only a question of time before these powerful instruments 
crowd out simpler models. . . .  Even if machine-learning and deep-learning tools are not 
now omnipresent, they will be soon.”). 
 178 Eaglin, supra note 93, at 119 (noting that the use of machine learning in risk tools 
causes interpretability issues because “the developers creating the tools cannot explain 
what factors a tool uses to predict recidivism risk”). 
 179 Because a computer may independently update the code algorithm in the machine 
learning process, it is not enough to provide the original source code.  “Online machine 
learning systems update their decision rules after every query, meaning that any 
disclosure will be obsolete as soon as it is made.”  Kroll et al., supra note 32, at 660.  
 180 Id. at 637 n.9. 
 181 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of Antoinette T. Bacon, Associate 
Deputy Attorney General) (“Consistent with the Act, PATTERN incorporates dynamic 
risk factors—things that an inmate can change over time.  Such dynamic factors include, 
among others, an inmate’s infractions, beneficial programs, and vocational courses.”). 
CYPHERT (DO NOT DELETE) 11/5/2020  2:42 PM 
362 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:331 
1.  Inmates’ Theoretical Ability to Reduce Risk Score 
In theory, the original PATTERN tool allowed an inmate to reduce 
his or her recidivism risk rather dramatically through dynamic factors 
such as job training and drug education.  Theoretically, the original 
PATTERN tool would have allowed a male inmate to reduce his general 
recidivism score by as many as nineteen points182 (though there is some 
dispute about which factors in that tool were truly dynamic and several 
ways to approach this calculation).183  To contextualize what this 
nineteen-point reduction could mean, imagine a male inmate to whom 
PATTERN assigned an initial general recidivism risk score of fifty.  This 
initial score was due to static factors—factors that are historical and/or 
outside of the inmate’s current control—namely, being age twenty-
three (+ thirty points); having been age twenty-two at the time of his 
first conviction (+ eight points); and having a BRAVO criminal history 
 
 182 According to Table 2 of the First Step Act Report, a hypothetical male inmate could 
receive the following reductions to his general recidivism score: twelve points for 
completing eleven or more programs; four points for completing residential drug 
treatment; two points for taking more than one technical or vocational courses; and one 
point for receiving drug education while incarcerated.  (Table 2 confusingly states that 
an inmate would receive a two-point deduction if they take zero technical or vocational 
courses but a zero-point deduction for taking two or more courses.  This appears to be 
an error and is treated as such here.  See Brennan Center letter, supra note 95 (“We 
believe that this [increase in risk-level point for completing vocational courses] may be 
a typographical error”).  The point allocation in the Updated Tool makes clear that 
completing programs reduces an inmate’s score.  See UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79,  
at 38.)  In the original PATTERN tool, female inmates received smaller deductions for 
those categories but could have additional reductions for participating in employment 
opportunities and complying with any financial responsibilities.  FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, 
supra note 55, at 53–55.  Additionally, I do not classify the factor “no need for drug 
treatment,” which deducts six points, as a “dynamic” factor because an inmate’s absence 
of the need for drug treatment is presumably historical by the time they are assessed for 
PATTERN purposes.  But in an attempt to acknowledge all dynamic deductions available 
under PATTERN, I have included the four-point deduction for an inmate who did need 
drug treatment and who received residential treatment, a more traditionally dynamic 
feature.  Id. 
 183 I did not classify as dynamic the factors “infraction convictions,” “history of 
violence,” “history of escape,” or “voluntary surrender,” because each is historical as of 
the time of the initial assessment and can only be changed by an inmate if he or she 
attempts an escape or has an infraction.  The developers of PATTERN, however, have 
classified “infraction convictions,” “history of violence,” and “history of escape” as 
dynamic factors.  See UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 7.  Other advocates have pointed 
out that PATTERN developers are “mistaken” in their classification of certain factors as 
dynamic.  See NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS, supra note 89 (statement of Sarah 
Anderson on behalf of FreedomWorks) (“[W]e believe that PATTERN mistakenly treats 
some factors as ‘dynamic’ that, although they can reasonably be expected to change 
while in prison, are not truly dynamic in nature.”).  Of course, an inmate would also 
reduce his or her PATTERN score on a subsequent rescoring simply by virtue of aging 
and being placed in a different band for the “age at time of assessment” factor.  Again, 
this is not a truly “dynamic” factor, and so I do not include it here. 
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score of six (+ twelve points).184  This hypothetical inmate’s score of fifty 
would place him in the “high” risk level under PATTERN,185 and thus 
preclude him from earning early release credits and other benefits, even 
though he has never done things that increase a PATTERN score, such 
as attempting escape or having “infraction violations” while 
incarcerated.  But if he was to earn the maximum deduction of nineteen 
points through dynamic factors like participation in available 
programming,186 his revised score would become thirty-one, thus 
placing him in the “low” risk level under PATTERN’s original risk-level 
cutoffs, and thereby allowing him to earn early release.187 
The revised PATTERN tool was purportedly designed to include 
additional dynamic factors that provide an inmate additional 
opportunities to earn deductions to his or her score.188  The opportunity 
to “earn” reductions is, at least for our hypothetical male inmate, not 
substantially increased with the revised PATTERN tool, even as the 
point “penalties” for factors like age at time of assessment and criminal 
history score are increased relative to the original PATTERN tool.189  
Imagine the same hypothetical male inmate.  His new general recidivism 
score under the revised PATTERN tool will have increased from fifty to 
fifty-one,190 even though nothing about him has changed.  Just as his 
initial score has increased by one point, the theoretical reduction he can 
earn through dynamic factors has likewise increased by one point.  He 
can now theoretically deduct six points for completing residential drug 
treatment, eight points for completing at least eleven programs, two 
 
 184 All of these point totals are drawn from FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55,  
at 53–55 tbl.2. 
 185 PATTERN places the “medium” risk-level cutoff for general recidivism at forty-
five; scores above that are labeled “high.”  Id. at 58 tbl.4. 
 186 See FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 53–55 for a full breakdown of the math 
and assumptions that go into the nineteen-point deduction calculation. 
 187 The PATTERN tool originally places the “low” risk-level cutoff for general 
recidivism at thirty-three.  FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 58 tbl.4. 
 188 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 8 (noting that the updated PATTERN tool 
includes “an additional dynamic measure of offender’s ‘infraction free’ period during his 
or her current term of incarceration”). 
 189 Under the original PATTERN tool, the points assigned for age at time of 
assessment ranged from zero for male inmates over age sixty to thirty for inmates aged 
eighteen to twenty-five.  FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 54.  In the revised 
PATTERN tool, the points assigned for age at time of assessment ranged from zero for 
inmates over age sixty to thirty-five for inmates under aged eighteen to twenty-five.  
UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 37.  Because the tool no longer assigns points for age 
at first conviction, some recalibration of the other remaining static factors is to be 
expected. 
 190 The static factors now give him an initial score as follows: being aged twenty-
three (+ thirty-five points); and having a BRAVO criminal history score of six (+ sixteen).  
UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 37–38. 
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points for participating in work programming, and four points if he 
earns his high school degree or GED.191  Thus, his total possible 
reduction is now twenty points, where it was previously nineteen 
points.  With his new base score of fifty-one and a reduction of twenty 
points, he has a score of thirty-one, the same as he did under the original 
PATTERN tool.192  This is because the new “dynamic factor” included in 
the revised PATTERN tool—a measure of how long the inmate had been 
“infraction free”—does not allow inmates to deduct points from their 
score but instead builds additional points onto the base score.193  
Further, because of the change to the risk-level cutoff scores announced 
in June of 2020, a score of thirty-one now places our hypothetical inmate 
in the medium risk-level category,194 ineligible for early release, where 
before a score of thirty-one placed him in the low risk-level category, 
eligible for early release.  So, for an inmate who had long been infraction 
free, he or she may well be worse off under the revised PATTERN tool.  
Indeed, the June Report acknowledges that under the revised tool, 4,430 
inmates’ scores did increase, from low to medium.195 
2.  Inmates’ Actual Ability to Reduce Risk Score 
The decision to reduce the total points inmates can deduct for 
participation in certain programming in the revised PATTERN tool196 is 
all the more troubling when you consider how unlikely it is that any 
inmate can actually participate in all of that programming to begin with.  
 
 191 See id. at 38–39.  As before, I have not classified the factor “no need for drug 
treatment,” which would now deduct nine points, as a “dynamic” factor, given that an 
inmate’s lack of need for drug treatment is presumably historical by the time he or she 
is assessed for PATTERN purposes.  As noted, inmates who did need drug treatment and 
received residential treatment can deduct six points under the revised PATTERN tool. 
 192 The Updated Report does not provide an explanation for why the points deducted 
or added under PATTERN changed in the updated version, but the risk-level cutoffs 
remained at the same level as in the original PATTERN tool. 
 193 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 37.  If an inmate has been infraction free for 
more than twelve months, he has zero points added to his PATTERN score.  If he has had 
an infraction in the past seven to twelve months, he has one point added.  If he has had 
an infraction in the past three to six months, he has two points added.  If he has had an 
infraction in the past three months, he has three points added.  There is no opportunity 
to actually deduct points under this factor. 
 194 JUNE REPORT, supra note 81, at 2. 
 195 Id. at 2–3.  The same report notes that there were also thousands of inmates 
whose scores decreased.  Almost no information is given about the demographics of 
these inmates, however, or why the change to the risk-level cutoff scores was necessary, 
nor why it was not publicly released for months. 
 196 For example, under the original tool, inmates could deduct twelve points for 
completing eleven or more programs.  FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 54.  In the 
revised tool, they can deduct only eight points for participating in eleven or more 
programs.  UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 38. 
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The preceding paragraphs use the terms “in theory,” “theoretically,” and 
“hypothetical,” and they use them with good reason.  Although 
PATTERN’s inclusion of dynamic factors is a step in the right direction, 
it is at present a hollow gesture in light of current inmates’ actual ability 
(or, more accurately, nonability) to earn deductions.  Advocates have 
criticized the BOP for its lack of educational and rehabilitative 
programming, and even when the programming exists, inmates face 
“long wait lists” before they can access it.197  Indeed, in the NACDL’s FOIA 
request about PATTERN, they seek specific information on BOP 
waitlists, “including numbers of offenders on each waitlist and time 
periods remaining on such waitlist by program and location.”198  As 
David Patton, the Executive Director of the Federal Defenders of New 
York, expressed to Congress in his testimony, even though the First Step 
Act “relies heavily on the BOP offering substantially increased 
programming and productive activities for incarcerated individuals . . . 
the BOP has failed to provide adequate programming to meet current 
needs, much less the increased demand that will be required to make 
the FSA a success.”199  The DOJ chose to develop the risk assessment 
portion of the risk and needs assessment tool before developing the 
needs assessment portion.  That is a decision that vastly undercuts the 
tool’s ability to properly weigh dynamic factors. 
When the DOJ publicly released the information about the 
PATTERN tool, it acknowledged that it fulfilled the “risk” portion of the 
risk and needs assessment but had not yet fulfilled the “needs” 
portion.200  The DOJ has reported that it will be relying initially on the 
 
 197 Rachel Anspach, How the First Step Act Got People Out of Prison and Back With 
Their Families, MIC (Dec. 24, 2019), https://www.mic.com/p/how-the-first-step-act-
got-people-out-of-prison-back-with-their-families-19629720 (quoting David Booth, 
deputy executive director of Black & Pink, an LGBTQ prison abolition organization, as 
saying, “[t]he BOP historically has long wait lists and inadequate programming . . . I’m 
afraid [PATTERN is] going to create a lot more problems and hurdles down the road”). 
 198 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of Norman Reimer, Executive 
Director of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers). 
 199 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of David E. Patton, Executive 
Director, Federal Defenders of New York). Patton went on to note that “[t]he true extent 
of the deficit is not known because the BOP has not been transparent about the number 
of programs offered, the capacity of these programs, and the length of the waitlists for 
these programs.”  Id. 
 200 See FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 64 n.3 (“As presently developed, 
PATTERN does not currently include a needs assessment component. . . .  [T]he BOP will 
continue to use its current needs assessment system, which is being modified and 
enhanced at the time of this writing.  The BOP’s needs assessment system will continue 
to be developed and enhanced over the coming months.”); see also Oversight Hearing, 
supra note 32 (statement of Antoinette T. Bacon, Associate Deputy Attorney General) 
(“The prototype needs assessment system is expected to be available for testing by the 
second quarter of 2020.”). 
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existing needs assessment the BOP implements, but that assessment is 
inadequate by nearly any measure.201  For example, according to a 2019 
report from the BOP, the wait list for literacy programs is approximately 
16,000 people long.202  When Congress first considered the First Step 
Act, the BOP and government labor unions expressed concern that 
facilities were already understaffed and, therefore, lacked adequate 
programming.203  The DOJ said that it anticipated having additional 
needs programming by the second quarter of 2020.204  The First Step 
Act, however, required that the DOJ complete the initial risk-level 
assessment for each inmate in a BOP facility before that, by January 
2020.205  Therefore, inmates were assessed by a PATTERN tool that took 
into account things like the employment and education opportunities 
they take advantage of, even though many of those inmates were held in 
facilities with limited to no education or employment opportunities.206 
 
 201 See Julie Samuels, Nancy La Vigne, & Chelsea Thomson, Next Steps in Federal 
Corrections Reform: Implementing and Building on the First Step Act, 32 FED. SENT. REP. 
92, 92 (2019) (noting that the BOP has been “characterized by dangerous overcrowding, 
escalating costs, and insufficient programming and services to prepare people for law 
abiding lives after release”); see also NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS, supra note 89 
(statement of Laura Mate on behalf of the Sentencing Resource Counsel Project, Federal 
Public and Community Defenders) (“There is significant evidence that current programs 
are inadequate to satisfy the congressional mandates in the First Step Act.”).  The DOJ 
appears to dispute this conclusion, at least in the First Step Act Report.  See FIRST STEP 
ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 61 (“BOP has a strong needs assessment process in place 
to match inmates with programs to address their criminogenic needs.”). 
 202 NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS, supra note 89 (statement of Antoine Prince 
Albert III on behalf of The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights and The 
Leadership Conference Education Fund) (citing U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL PRISON 
SYSTEM FY 2019 PERFORMANCE BUDGET, CONGRESSIONAL SUBMISSION, SALARIES AND EXPENSES 27 
(2019), https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1034421/download).  But see UPDATED 
REPORT, supra note 79, at 18 (noting that the term “waitlist” may not mean the same thing 
in BOP reports and that “[t]he vast majority of Bureau programs do not have capacity-
related constraints”). 
 203 See NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS, supra note 89 (statement of Brandon L. 
Garrett and Megan T. Stevenson) (“During the consideration of the Act, the American 
Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, and Council of Prison Locals called for 
sentencing reforms, but raised the concern as to the use of risk assessment, that federal 
prisoners are suffering from ‘sustained cuts’ to staffing levels, which reduces access to 
rehabilitative programming.”). 
 204 Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of Antoinette T. Bacon, Associate 
Deputy Attorney General) (“The prototype needs assessment system is expected to be 
available for testing by the second quarter of 2020.”); FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra  
note 55, at 78 (“The prototype system addressing [the needs assessment] is expected to 
be available for testing by the second quarter of 2020.”). 
 205 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 83 (“Importantly, the Department will 
meet the FSA’s requirement to assess all BOP prisoners by January 2020.”). 
 206 Several commentators have criticized the amount of policymaking that the First 
Step Act delegated to the BOP.  See, e.g., Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of 
David E. Patton, Executive Director, Federal Defenders of New York) (“As a result of the 
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Further, even once DOJ develops the needs assessment, the BOP 
only plans on rolling it out for the first year in eight facilities.207  Only 
after assessing this rollout and validating any results will the needs 
assessment be introduced to the remaining 106 BOP facilities, with no 
definite timetable given for completion of that process.208  In the 
Updated Report, the DOJ claims that the BOP has already begun the 
process of expanding its programming and hiring staff, and notes that 
the First Step Act calls for $75 million per year in implementation 
funding.209  It remains to be seen if the BOP will be willing and able to 
prioritize that money on recidivism reduction programming.210 
3.  Weight of Static versus Dynamic Factors in PATTERN 
Even assuming the BOP could properly fund and implement such 
programming, PATTERN still disproportionately weighs static features 
over dynamic ones.211  In the Updated Report, the DOJ said that it had 
considered “assigning more weight to dynamic factors” but did not 
ultimately do so because it tested the updated PATTERN tool “to ensure 
that individuals could successfully move from a higher to a lower risk 
score.”212  The DOJ provided several examples in Attachment A to the 
Updated Report that it claimed demonstrated “how different types of 
inmates can use the dynamic factors in the updated PATTERN to lower 
their risk score.”213  What the eight examples in Attachment A actually 
show, however, is something different.  
 
Act, the BOP will now establish and implement a risk and needs assessment system that 
will directly determine how long tens of thousands of people serve in prison.  If not done 
wisely, there are countless ways the system will result in unfair, biased, and overly 
punitive outcomes.  With history as a guide, this committee should be very concerned 
about whether the BOP will rise to the challenge of these new responsibilities.”).  
 207 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 79 (“To collect a sufficient amount of data 
for evaluation purposes, identify issues and trends, and conduct a preliminary 
assessment of effectiveness, BOP plans to test the system using eight facilities, across 
four security levels and six regions, for twelve months.”). 
 208 Id.  (“After testing has been conducted and the results validated, BOP will 
implement the final system and begin rolling it out to the remaining 114 BOP sites.”). 
 209 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 21–22.  
 210 The June Report notes that “April 6, 2020, DOJ’s Office of Justice Programs 
announced nearly $70 million in 
grants to support successful reentry.”  JUNE REPORT, supra note 81, at 5.  If these grants 
have been awarded as of the date of this Article, that information does not appear to be 
public, and so this Article is unable to assess their likely impact. 
 211 See Brennan Center letter, supra note 95, describing the original PATTERN tool 
(“PATTERN appears to under-value dynamic factors related to rehabilitation . . . .  Taken 
together, the balance of factors seems to reflect an over-reliance on static factors and an 
under-valuing of rehabilitative factors.”). 
 212 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 11–12. 
 213 Id. 
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The eight examples look at a male and female version of four 
inmate archetypes: “young drug offender taking multiple programs,” 
“‘average’ released inmate,” “aging career criminal,” and “white collar 
offender.”214  For each of the examples, the Updated Report assesses 
how the inmate’s risk score would change under three different 
scenarios: first, if they were a “model” inmate (one who took advantage 
of nearly all programmatic and educational opportunities and avoided 
any infractions while incarcerated); second, if they were a “non-
compliant” inmate (one who did not take advantage of programmatic 
and educational opportunities and who had infractions while 
incarcerated); and third, if they were a “mixed” inmate (participated in 
some programming but not all that is offered and had some infractions, 
though less serious ones).215  
The point of the examples is obviously to illustrate that dynamic 
factors have weight and inmates control their destinies under 
PATTERN—if you are a model inmate, you will have the ability to earn 
an earlier release.  But it really shows that the factor that makes the most 
difference in reducing most inmates’ scores under PATTERN is that they 
will inevitably age, rather than anything that inmates themselves can 
control.  For example, in the very first example provided in the Updated 
Report, a twenty-five-year-old male drug offender who is a “model” 
inmate and takes advantage of every single educational, rehabilitative, 
or professional program offered can reduce his score from a fifty-seven 
to a twenty-one, a reduction of thirty-six points.216  But this reduction is 
not due solely to dynamic factors.  Instead, fourteen points of the thirty-
six, nearly forty percent, are awarded simply because the inmate aged 
from one bracket into another.   
Indeed, the fourteen-point reduction awarded for “aging” is the 
largest deduction the inmate earns, dwarfing points deducted for 
earning a GED (four points), completing drug treatment (six points), 
completing a work program (two points), avoiding any violent 
infractions (two points), and completing eleven or more programs 
(eight points).217  In order to get the fourteen-point aging reduction, our 
twenty-five-year-old inmate, who only had a five-year sentence to begin 
with, would have had to reach the minimum age of twenty-nine and 
therefore be incarcerated for at least four years of his five-year 
sentence.218  Indeed, because the revised PATTERN tool’s “age at time of 
 
 214 Id. at 27–34. 
 215 Id.  
 216 Id. at 27. 
 217 Id.  
 218 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at App. II, p.37. 
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assessment” factor has age brackets that range up to ten years,219 many 
inmates could serve their entire sentences without ever “aging out” of 
the age bracket they entered PATTERN in and thus never receive any 
“aging” deductions.  Despite this, the fourteen-point deduction for 
“aging” is the largest in any of the eight examples provided in the 
Updated Report.  Because aging is not a proper “dynamic factor,” these 
examples do not provide evidence for the argument that PATTERN 
properly weighs dynamic factors. 
Including dynamic factors in the PATTERN tool was a good first 
step.  But for this inclusion to be meaningful, PATTERNS’s developers 
should reconsider the weighting of the dynamic factors or, at the very 
least, should explain and justify them, and much more work needs to be 
done to give inmates a real chance to access and complete anti-
recidivism programming. 
C.  Seeking Input from Experts and Stakeholder Groups 
In developing PATTERN, the DOJ and the PATTERN developers 
sought the input of experts in the field of risk assessment, stakeholder 
organizations, and the public at large.  The DOJ announced a 
commitment to refining and recalibrating PATTERN over time, both as 
a result of public feedback as well as the result of the initial classification 
of BOP inmates.  For example, one DOJ official testified before Congress 
in October 2019 that the Department has continued to consult with the 
Independent Review Committee (IRC) outside experts “to consider 
ways to improve PATTERN,” noting that this improvement “is an 
ongoing process, and [the DOJ] looks forward to refining the [risk and 
needs assessment system] over time.”220  Further, in the First Step Act 
Report, the DOJ committed to data review and tool reassessment before 
using PATTERN to assess any individual inmate.221  The DOJ has also 
requested bids from outside experts who would assess PATTERN and 
 
 219 Id. at 37 (including age ranges between 40–50 and 50–60). 
 220 Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of Antoinette T. Bacon, Associate 
Deputy Attorney General). 
 221 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 70 (“After reviewing the input, we will 
reassess the tool, make any appropriate changes, and begin the process of assessing each 
individual inmate.”). 
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offer recommendations.222  Recalibration is a best practice223 and 
therefore a laudable goal.  Seeking public input is also an important best 
practice, and the DOJ deserves to be commended for it.  Of course, 
seeking public input is one thing; embracing it and implementing it is 
another. 
1.  Statutory Requirements 
As explained above, in developing PATTERN, the DOJ contracted 
with two researchers with prior experience in risk assessment as well 
as published scholarship on the topic, Dr. Duwe and Dr. Hamilton.224  As 
required by the First Step Act, the NIJ named a six-person IRC that 
included members with peer-reviewed scholarship about risk 
prediction and members with prior experience implementing and 
assessing risk assessment systems.225  It appears that the IRC took a 
relatively robust role in the review of PATTERN, as the DOJ claims that 
the tool developers spent “more than 100 hours addressing questions 
and concerns raised by the IRC” after PATTERN’s initial release.226  The 
DOJ claimed that the IRC’s recommendations “helped confirm DOJ’s 
confidence in the accuracy of PATTERN,”227 though it also acknowledged 
 
 222 The June Report notes that “On February 10, 2020, the Department released a 
competitive funding opportunity to hire outside consultants to review and revalidate 
PATTERN on an annual basis for up to five years. The deadline for submitting 
submissions was April 24, 2020. The peer review process is underway.” JUNE REPORT, 
supra note 81, at 3.  
 223 See Kehl et al., supra note 30, at 33 (“States should require regular repetition of 
validity studies and develop procedures to make appropriate alterations based on any 
changes in the population or new information that emerges about these tools.”). 
 224 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (Statement of Antoinette T. Bacon, Associate 
Deputy Attorney General) (“In developing PATTERN, the Department contracted with 
two national experts in risk assessment systems—Dr. Grant Duwe, the Director of 
Research for the Minnesota Department of Corrections, and Dr. Zachary Hamilton, an 
Associate Professor of Criminal Justice and Criminology and the Director of the 
Washington State Institute for Criminal Justice.”). 
 225 The Act was fairly prescriptive about the composition of the IRC, requiring that 
the NIJ “appoint not fewer than 6 members to the Independent Review Committee,” and 
that “all [IRC members] have expertise in risk and needs assessment systems and shall 
include (1) 2 individuals who have published peer-reviewed scholarship about risk and 
needs assessments in both corrections and community settings; (2) 2 corrections 
practitioners who have developed and implemented a risk assessment tool in a 
corrections system or in a community supervision setting, including 1 with prior 
experience working within the Bureau of Prisons; and (3) 1 individual with expertise in 
assessing risk assessment implementation.”  First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 
§ 107(c)–(d), 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). 
 226 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 2.  
 227 Id. 
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that it did not adopt all of the IRC’s recommendations for updating the 
tool.228 
Per the Act’s requirements, the NIJ also selected a “nonpartisan and 
nonprofit organization with expertise in the study and development of 
risk and needs assessment tools to host the Independent Review 
Committee,”229 the nonpartisan Hudson Institute.230  DOJ officials 
testified before Congress that the Hudson Institute “took no institutional 
position on the First Step Act at any time, and . . . [that the NIJ] select[ed] 
. . . the most qualified group of criminal justice experts . . . to advise the 
Attorney General.”231 
2.  Listening Sessions and Congressional Testimony 
The DOJ also sought feedback from stakeholder organizations as 
well as the public at large during PATTERN’s development.232  The 
Department held three listening sessions in April and May of 2019.233  
Those who submitted written and/or oral comments included 
attorneys representing the Federal Defenders office,234 members of 
organizations ranging from the Heritage Foundation to the ACLU,235 and 
criminal justice reform organizations.236  
After the PATTERN tool was announced, the DOJ continued to seek 
input on the tool, commencing a forty-five-day “public study period” 
during which “the public [would] be able to review the System and 
 
 228 Id.  
 229 First Step Act § 107(b). 
 230 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of Dr. John P. Walters, Member, 
First Step Act Independent Review Committee) (“In April 2019, the National Institute of 
Justice awarded Hudson Institute a contract to serve as host organization for the 
Independent Review Committee specified by Title I of the First Step Act of 2018.”); see 
also FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 9–10. 
 231 Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of Dr. John P. Walters, Member, First 
Step Act Independent Review Committee). 
 232 Id. (noting that June of 2019, “the IRC solicited recommendations, concerns, and 
priorities for further research from nearly eighty-five expert, external organizations and 
individuals concerned with criminal justice, victims’ rights, and law enforcement.”). 
 233 Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of Antoinette T. Bacon, Associate 
Deputy Attorney General) (“The Department also held three listening sessions in April 
and May of 2019 to allow stakeholders to provide input regarding the [risk and needs 
assessment system].”). 
 234 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 15. 
 235 Id. at 16.  
 236 Id. at 15–16; see also Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of Antoinette T. 
Bacon, Associate Deputy Attorney General) (“The Department received written and in-
person statements from 27 individuals representing a variety of communities, including 
legal experts, law enforcement, criminal justice advocates, academics, victims’ rights 
advocates, and others.”). 
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consider ways in which it may be improved.”237  The DOJ specifically 
invited and said it would welcome comment on the dynamic factors 
chosen for inclusion in the PATTERN tool.238  As part of that public 
comment period, NIJ hosted two more listening sessions where eight 
“stakeholder organizations” provided input and feedback and another 
eight submitted written comments.239  At the end of that public study 
period, DOJ officials familiar with the creation of PATTERN testified 
before the House Oversight Committee, alongside representatives from 
a variety of organizations and academics. 
In seeking input from interested organizations, the DOJ took a step 
toward one of the advocates’ goals: public participation in the 
development of recidivism prediction tools.  One academic has argued 
that for recidivism risk prediction tools to be more fair, these tools 
“must reflect the values of the communities where the tools are 
applied,”240 and that “[o]nly the communities affected by the tools can 
voice those values.”241  She concludes that “public notice and comment 
on normative decisions throughout the development process [of 
recidivism prediction tools] would resolve many” issues such as 
fairness, bias, and accountability.242  In the written statement the ABA 
submitted as part of NIJ’s listening sessions on PATTERN, President 
Judy Perry Martinez applauded the DOJ’s “commitment to public 
engagement,” noting that such engagement “may strengthen public 
confidence in the assessments that PATTERN renders.”243 
 
 237 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 70; see also Oversight Hearing, supra  
note 32 (Statement of Antoinette T. Bacon, Associate Deputy Attorney General) (“In 
announcing PATTERN, the Department made clear that it was only the first step in 
implementing the Act.  Indeed, as part of PATTERN’s announcement, the Department 
immediately began the process of considering how to improve it.  That process included 
a 45-day public study period that recently concluded.”). 
 238 See FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 64 n.10 (“During the 45-day public 
study period discussed in Chapter 4, the Department welcomes input on what changes 
to these variables may increase predictability.”). 
 239 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 3.  The NIJ compiled all of the statements from 
the September 2019 listening sessions into a report.  See NIJ LISTENING SESSION 
STATEMENTS, supra note 89.  The eight “in-person” comments came from academics and 
representatives of organizations including the Sentencing Project, the Federal Public 
and Community Defenders, and the Charles Koch Institute.  Id.  Written statements came 
from, among others, a victims’ rights group, Deloitte Consulting LLP, and the American 
Bar Association.  Id. 
 240 Eaglin, supra note 93, at 105. 
 241 Id. at 108. 
 242 Id. at 109. 
 243 NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS, supra note 89 (Aug. 16, 2019 letter from Judy 
Perry Martinez, President of the ABA, to Attorney General William Barr).  
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Of course, for public participation to be meaningful, the DOJ had to 
not only solicit the feedback on PATTERN but also take it seriously.  In 
the Updated Report the DOJ issued in January of 2020 announcing 
certain changes to PATTERN, the Department claimed that it had “taken 
the feedback [it received] seriously and considered the various and, at 
times, competing views presented.”244  Notwithstanding these 
assurances, many stakeholder groups have expressed frustration that 
the DOJ has not taken their input seriously enough.  For example, 
victims’ rights groups expressed frustration that PATTERN reflected a 
“lack of regard for victims” as well as a failure to listen to the input they 
had previously provided.245  
Certain criticisms of PATTERN have made for strange bedfellows.  
In his written statement to the NIJ after their September 2019 listening 
session, the General Counsel for the American Conservative Union 
Foundation remarked upon the diversity of the organizations calling for 
changes to PATTERN: 
It is worth noting that groups on the right (FreedomWorks 
and Stand Together), left (ACLU, the Leadership Conference 
on Civil and Human Rights, and #Cut50), and center (US 
Justice Action Network and National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers) voiced similar concerns about the current 
iteration of PATTERN. In an era of polarized politics, the fact 
that these voices are unified underscores the compelling need 
for changes to the risk assessment tool.246 
But there is also evidence that the PATTERN developers did listen 
to some of the public comments they received and have already 
reengineered the tool to reflect that feedback.  For example, the Brennan 
Center made a compelling argument about the lack of emphasis on 
dynamic factors in the original PATTERN tool by pointing out the 
relative weights that the tool placed on whether someone voluntarily 
 
 244 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 1. 
 245 NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS, supra note 89 (statement of Prof. Mary Graw 
Leary on behalf of the Victims Advisory Group, United States Sentencing Commission) 
(“[T]he V.A.G. was disappointed with the lack of regard for victims and a failure to utilize 
the input previously provided by victim groups who addressed this body in May.”); see 
also NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS, supra note 89 (statement of Bridgette Stumpf on 
behalf of Network for Victim Recovery of DC) (“[W]e are gravely disappointed by the 
absence of any substantive mention or consideration of crime victims and their rights” 
in the First Step Act Report.).  In its Updated Report, the DOJ reaffirmed its commitment 
to victims’ rights.  See UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 17 (“DOJ will continue to engage 
and communicate with organizations that represent crime victims as it works to fully 
implement PATTERN, the forthcoming needs assessment, and other provisions of the 
FSA.”). 
 246 NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS, supra note 89 (statement of David H. Safavian on 
behalf of American Conservative Union Foundation).  
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surrendered versus on someone’s participation in recidivism reduction 
programming: 
Tellingly, for men, whether the person surrendered to federal 
custody, a static factor, counts for 12 points—as much as 
completing more than 10 recidivism reduction programs. 
Postsentencing voluntary surrenders, the only type that 
PATTERN appears to score, are rare, occurring in only 25 
percent of the diagnostic sample. Worse, our understanding is 
that such surrenders occur most frequently in cases 
presenting special circumstances or involving affluent 
defendants. PATTERN should value rehabilitation above 
access and privilege.247 
In January of 2020, the DOJ announced that the PATTERN tool 
would no longer consider whether an inmate had voluntarily 
surrendered because it “removed or changed certain measures that 
might be associated with bias, especially racial bias, in order to 
implement the most fair and predictive tool possible.”248  The DOJ also 
removed the factor that considered an inmate’s age at their first 
arrest/conviction for the same reason.249  
These changes, and the announcement that they are made as a 
direct result of feedback, would be more welcome if PATTERN had not 
been simultaneously changed, without explanation, to make it even 
harder for certain inmates to initially score in the low or minimum risk 
level.250  Further, there is a long list of issues raised and 
recommendations made by advocates after the initial release of the tool 
that the Updated Report dismisses.  For example, despite receiving 
multiple requests to release the dataset they used to develop PATTERN 
and to make public additional information about the tool’s development, 
the Updated Report declines to do so, instead saying they will give 
 
 247 Brennan Center letter, supra note 95, at 6.  The Brennan Center further pointed 
out that in the original PATTERN tool, “[p]articipation in prison education programs, 
which is proven to reduce recidivism, is barely scored, and not scored at all for men.”  Id.  
The updated PATTERN tool does allow men to earn point deductions for educational 
attainment, though those deductions remain smaller than the deductions available for 
female inmates.  See UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 39. 
 248 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 9.  
 249 Id.  But see supra note 189, explaining that PATTERN was revised to increase the 
points assigned for other static factors and to decrease the points that could be earned 
as deductions. 
 250 As explained above, the Updated Report removed voluntary surrender and age at 
first arrest as factors at the same time that the tool was recalibrated to increase the total 
points for static features like age at time of assessment and decrease the point 
deductions for dynamic factors like participation in prison programming.  Further, the 
risk-level cutoff points were lowered without any meaningful explanation. 
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certain researchers a limited opportunity to review the data.251  
Likewise, despite several calls to narrow the broad definition of 
recidivism they adopted, the DOJ defended its original definition.252  
Finally, despite numerous criticism of the use of AUC to assess accuracy, 
much of which is discussed below, the DOJ does not even address that 
issue in its Updated Report. 
D.  Issues with AUC and an Overall Focus on “Accuracy” 
In developing PATTERN, the DOJ has seemed especially 
preoccupied with establishing that the tool is “accurate” and has 
favorable predictive reliability.253  The PATTERN developers repeatedly 
tout the original tool’s AUC score in the First Step Act Report, and their 
willingness to recalibrate the tool seems to be constrained in part by a 
fear of making any changes that result in too great a reduction to the 
AUC score.  For example, in the Updated Report, the DOJ announced that 
removing certain factors from PATTERN “reduce[d] PATTERN’s 
predictive accuracy by approximately one percent,” but that it “viewed 
this decrease as acceptable, if it prevents the actual or perceived 
perpetuation of any bias.”254  Further, the only explanation given for the 
decision to lower the risk-level cutoff levels was that doing so 
“ensure[d] that inmates were accurately placed in the appropriate Risk 
Level Category and the tool achieved the same high-level of predictive 
accuracy.”255  
1.  Accuracy Is Not a Straightforward Goal 
Although this hyper-focus on accuracy is understandable,256 it is 
problematic for several reasons, especially given the conflation in the 
PATTERN reports of accuracy as meaning a higher AUC score.  First, 
accuracy cannot be the only goal of a recidivism prediction tool, and 
“may need to yield to other important goals, such as differential validity, 
group fairness, and individual rights.”257  Further, accuracy is not a 
 
 251 See supra notes 157, 160 and 161 and accompanying text. 
 252 See UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 13; see also supra note 96. 
 253 “In crafting the System, the Department worked to make the benefits of the FSA 
as widely available as possible without compromising predictive reliability.”  FIRST STEP 
ACT REPORT, supra note 55 (Letter from William Barr, Attorney General). 
 254 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 9. 
 255 June Report, supra note 81, at 2.  
 256 “Risk tool developers have a natural incentive to focus on overall accuracy.”  
Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (letter attached to statement of David E. Patton, 
Executive Director, Federal Defenders of New York). 
 257 Id.  Mr. Patton goes on to note that “[s]electing the right tradeoff between these 
sometimes competing goals are more rightly within the power of policymakers and 
stakeholders.” 
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simple target, and developers make important decisions in even 
defining what accuracy means.  For example, is it more important that 
PATTERN have high specificity (which measures the algorithm’s 
accuracy among the true negatives—people “who are not ultimately 
rearrested”) or that it have high sensitivity (which “measures the 
algorithm’s accuracy among the true positives—people who are 
ultimately rearrested”)?  Put another way, do we care more about 
avoiding false positives (falsely classifying an inmate as likely to 
reoffend) or false negatives (falsely classifying an inmate as unlikely to 
reoffend)?258  Algorithms like PATTERN will have to contend with 
Blackstone’s ratio—”it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that 
one innocent suffer”259—just as judges throughout time have.  
Algorithms can be designed to achieve one definition of accuracy or 
parity, but not all of them at the same time.260 
2.  AUC Is a Weak Proxy for Accuracy 
Even if accuracy were a simple or straightforward goal, using AUC 
to assess it is not without risk and criticism.  As noted above, AUC for 
PATTERN is best thought of as a measure of how often someone who 
reoffended was placed in a higher risk category than someone who did 
not.  Although that information is valuable, it is not a complete picture 
of “accuracy” by any means.261  For example, an AUC score cannot tell us 
if the chosen risk-level cutoffs are well calibrated because “[p]redictive 
accuracy measures like the AUC value provide no insight into whether 
the cut-off points located between high, medium, and low recidivism 
risk categories accurately calibrate with actual outcomes in the real 
world.”262  In other words, while the AUC can tell us something about 
how well PATTERN distinguishes recidivists from non-recidivists, it 
 
 258 For a more fulsome discussion of specificity versus sensitivity, see Mayson, supra 
note 99, at 2243–45. 
 259 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1743 (William Draper 
Lewis ed., Rees Welsh & Co. 1902) (1765). 
 260 Mayson, supra note 99, at 2248 (“An algorithm can be designed to achieve any one 
of the above metrics of output equality, but not all of them together. That is, an algorithm 
cannot be designed to achieve ‘total fairness.’”); see also Richard Berk et al., Fairness in 
Criminal Justice Risk Assessments: The State of the Art 1 (Univ. Pa. Working Paper  
No. 2017-1.0, 2017) (arguing that “there are at least six kinds of fairness, some of which 
are incompatible with one another and with accuracy”). 
 261 See, e.g., Oversight Hearing, supra note 32, at 4 (statement of Prof. Melissa 
Hamilton) (“[T]he AUC has serious limitations and thus cannot present a holistic portrait 
of a tool’s abilities.”). 
 262 Eaglin, supra note 93, at 91; see also Hopkinson, supra note 128, at 742 (“[I]n 
statistics, there is no consensus as to which AUC scores represent small, moderate, or 
large effect sizes.”). 
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cannot tell us very much at all about how accurately the tool will be able 
to predict future recidivism.263  An AUC score cannot even tell us 
whether the majority of errors PATTERN makes are false positives or 
false negatives.264  
With all of the potential problems involved in using AUC as a proxy 
for accuracy, it is not surprising that even Dr. Hamilton and Dr. Duwe, 
the outside consultants hired to develop PATTERN, have themselves 
written about AUC’s limitations in their prior publications.265  This 
makes the decision to declare the tool “validated” by using AUC values 
all the more puzzling.266  Because AUC can be so confusing, many 
laypeople (and even some researchers) incorrectly conclude that AUC is 
a measure of how well a tool predicts recidivism, and thus that an AUC 
score of .8 means that a tool is right 80% of the time about whether or 
not someone reoffends.  It does not mean anything remotely close to 
that.  Rather, as explained above, it means that 80% of the time, the tool 
will classify someone who does end up reoffending as being in a higher 
risk category than someone who does not. 
3.  Racial Disparities in PATTERN 
The DOJ does not just use AUC to support its argument that 
PATTERN is “validated”; it also uses it to counter arguments that 
PATTERN is racially biased.  As noted above, PATTERN’s developers 
used the calculated AUC scores to bolster the conclusion that there is 
“minimal” racial or ethnic disparity with respect to PATTERN’s 
predictive value,267 and that “the PATTERN instrument’s predictive 
performance is unbiased across racial and ethnic classifications.”268  
Several advocates, however, have challenged that conclusion.  In a letter 
to the NIJ on behalf of the Brennan Center, Ames Grawert pointed out 
that  
 
 263 For more on the issue of discrimination (distinguishing those who reoffend from 
those who do not) versus calibration (“how accurate the tool statistically estimates 
recidivism”), and why AUC is a better measure of discrimination, see Oversight Hearing, 
supra note 32, at 4 (statement of Prof. Melissa Hamilton).  
 264 Id.  
 265 See id. at 5 (citing to previous studies published by Drs. Duwe and Hamilton that 
noted that AUC validation is “rather easily achieved” and not something that should be 
given great weight or solely relied upon to assess accuracy). 
 266 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 84 (“PATTERN was developed using a 
seven-year dataset of BOP releases, and it was validated as an effective predictor of 
recidivism over the inmates’ subsequent three-year period in the community.”). 
 267 Id. at 60 (“Overall, these findings indicate strong and comparable prediction 
strength for PATTERN models across all race/ethnicity categories, suggesting minimal 
racial/ethnic disparity for PATTERN’s prediction strength.”). 
 268 Id. at 63. 
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PATTERN identified more than half of all Black men (53 
percent) in the diagnostic sample as having a high risk of 
recidivism, compared to 29 percent of white men.  Indeed, the 
plurality of white men (30 percent) were classified as 
“minimum risk”; just 7 percent of Black men received the 
same classification.269   
Racial disparities like this are not necessarily surprising in light of the 
fact that PATTERN was developed from a BOP dataset, and therefore 
any historical racial disparities in our criminal justice system.  For 
instance, issues like Black defendants being given longer sentences for 
the same underlying crime than white defendants270 or Black people 
having higher arrest rates for drug use than white people—despite 
having similar underlying drug usage rates271—are codified in the 
data.272  Even if PATTERN was designed to be racially neutral, the fact 
that it relies on data that is not racially neutral means it will produce 
racially disproportionate results. 
After the original release of the PATTERN tool, advocates 
suggested ameliorating this racial bias by eliminating or reducing 
PATTERN’s reliance on an inmate’s criminal history in calculating a risk 
score.273  In response to these criticisms and suggestions, the Updated 
 
 269 Brennan Center letter, supra note 95.  
 270 See, e.g., UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN 
SENTENCING: 
AN UPDATE TO THE 2012 BOOKER REPORT (Nov. 2017) (concluding that Black men received 
sentences on average 19.1 percent longer than similarly situated white men during the 
four-year period that was studied). 
 271 Brennan Center letter, supra note 95 (“Due to historical discrimination and 
enforcement patterns, Black men and women may have longer criminal records than 
their white counterparts despite similar offending patterns. Blacks are 
disproportionately arrested for drug offenses, for example, despite using drugs at rates 
similar to whites.”); see also NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS, supra note 89 (statement 
of Antoine Prince Albert III on behalf of The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human 
Rights) (“Fourth, NIJ’s claim that PATTERN’s ‘predictive performance is unbiased across 
racial and ethnic classifications’ ignores historical and enduring patterns of racial bias 
and discrimination that infect the data upon which PATTERN relies.”). 
 272 See, e.g., Mayson, supra note 99, at 2251 (“Any form of prediction that relies on 
data about the past will produce racial disparity if the past data shows the event that we 
aspire to predict—the target variable—occurring with unequal frequency across racial 
groups.”). 
 273 See, e.g., Brennan Center letter, supra note 95 (“PATTERN could be designed to 
incorporate criminal history in a novel way, by discounting the impact of drug 
convictions. Better yet, it could exclude arrest records entirely when ‘scoring’ someone’s 
criminal history, for the reasons stated in the previous section, and focus solely on a 
person’s history of conviction and incarceration.”); Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 
(statement of Prof. Melissa Hamilton) (suggesting that researchers use the PATTERN 
dataset to determine if the criminal history factor accounts for most of the racial 
disparity, and if so, that “modifying criminal history in risk-sensitive ways may improve 
the tool and its equitable outcomes.”).  
CYPHERT (DO NOT DELETE) 11/5/2020  2:44 PM 
2020] REPROGRAMMING RECIDIVISM 379 
Report points once again to PATTERN’s AUC scores and claims that 
these establish that PATTERN is a “neutral assessment tool.”274  The DOJ 
further says, without explaining why, that “[t]he risk assessment tool 
cannot correct for any outside biases that lead to higher recidivism.”275 
4.  More Accurate Than What? 
A more proper way of assessing the accuracy and fairness of 
PATTERN may not be to ask, “Is it fair?” but to ask, “Is it fair as opposed 
to the alternatives?”  Is PATTERN better at predicting recidivism, and 
doing so in a fair way, than are judges or probation officers?  There is 
some evidence that algorithmic recidivism prediction tools do 
outperform the “unaided clinical judgment” of people, even trained 
professionals.276  Some academics have argued that even where a 
recidivism prediction tool like PATTERN may produce biased results, 
“the default alternative—subjective risk assessment—is very likely to 
be worse.”277  Nonetheless, if PATTERN can be improved in ways that 
minimize racial bias without reducing its accuracy, as many 
commentators have suggested it can,278 the DOJ must consider those 
improvements.   
E.  Unclear Opportunities to Appeal/Challenge 
It is not entirely clear at this point where the information the 
PATTERN tool uses to assess each new inmate will come from, but the 
most likely source seems to be the Presentence Investigation Report 
(“PSR”) that the United States Probation Office completes for each 
federal criminal defendant who has pleaded or been found guilty.279  
 
 274 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 9. 
 275 Id. 
 276 See, e.g., Goel et al., supra note 99, at 2–4 (noting that algorithms tend to 
outperform human judgment, even criminal justice professionals’ judgment, when it 
comes to predicting recidivism); Kehl et al., supra note 30, at 11–12 (discussing how 
many academics “argue that actuarial assessment, which is at work in risk-assessment 
algorithms, is preferable to clinical assessment,” and that “studies have generally 
credited greater accuracy and predictive validity to the objectivity of actuarial tools 
compared to the theoretical nature professional clinical judgment”).  
 277 Mayson, supra note 99, at 2277–78 n.208–09. 
 278 See supra note 273. 
 279 The First Step Act Report explains how a PSR is created.  See FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, 
supra note 55, at 91 n.15 (“Prior to sentencing, the probation officer will interview the 
defendant and conduct an investigation to provide the sentencing judge with pertinent 
information relevant for sentencing. This information is captured in a Presentence 
Investigation Report and includes details of the defendant’s family history, community 
ties, education background, employment history and physical and mental health.”).  
Other portions of that Report suggest that the PSR is where much of the PATTERN data 
would come from.  See id. at 75 (“BOP has held preliminary discussions with the United 
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Although this may be an obvious choice for populating data for 
PATTERN, it is not one without problems.  First, if the information in the 
PSR is incorrect, the inmate will face “great difficulty” trying to have it 
corrected.280  This is because “[t]he sentencing court does not have 
jurisdiction to correct the PSR after sentencing, thus creating a 
‘jurisdictional obstacle’ for the inmate.”281  Of course, an inmate might 
not even know that the information in his or her PSR was incorrect, as 
some parts may be considered “confidential” and kept from the 
defendant and his or her counsel.282  Finally, sentencing information like 
the PSR is admitted into evidence under the lower “preponderance of 
the evidence” standard, and so the PSR can include hearsay.283  
Wherever the PATTERN information comes from, it appears that 
an inmate has only one opportunity to challenge or “appeal” if the risk 
score the algorithm assigns to him or her places them outside of the 
“minimal” or “low” range: through a warden override.284  There are 
several reasons a warden may decline to provide such an override.  First, 
 
States Probation Office about supplementing the Presentence Investigation Report with 
more detailed education information about learning needs.”).  Deloitte Consulting LLP, 
which has done previous consulting work for the DOJ, recommended at one of the 
listening sessions that prison staff “use information in the presentence report to 
populate data in PATTERN and the needs assessment.”  NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS, 
supra note 89 (statement of Deloitte Consulting LLP). 
 280 Gregory W. Carman & Tamar Harutunian, Fairness at the Time of Sentencing: The 
Accuracy of the 
Presentence Report, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 7 (2004). 
 281 Id.  
 282 Kehl et al., supra note 30, at 15 (“Although the information in the PSI is generally 
made available to the defendant or his counsel as well, certain information or parts of 
the report the report may be considered confidential and kept from the defendant.”).  
 283 Noel L. Hillman, The Use of Artificial Intelligence in Gauging the Risk of Recidivism, 
58 JUDGES J. 36, 37 (2019) (noting that “while the process [of creating the PSR] is largely 
transparent with input from the defendant and counsel, the officer obtains the 
information through ex parte interviews of third parties and a review of documents 
often containing multiple layers of hearsay”). 
 284 See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 102(g)(1)(D), 132 Stat. 5194 
(2018), which provides that an inmate, even one who has not been labeled low or 
minimal risk by PATTERN, may petition the warden “to be transferred to prerelease 
custody or supervised release” and that the warden may approve such a petition “after 
the warden’s determination that—the prisoner would not be a danger to society if 
transferred to prerelease custody or supervised release; the prisoner has made a good 
faith effort to lower their recidivism risk through participation in recidivism reduction 
programs or productive activities; and the prisoner is unlikely to recidivate[.]”  
Advocates have urged the DOJ and BOP to consider having another, independent appeals 
process for inmates to challenge their PATTERN score.  See, e.g., Oversight Hearing, supra 
note 32 (statement of Prof. Melissa Hamilton) (“A stand-alone mechanism for disputing 
risk scores must be established. The current plan appears to be to simply apply the 
current prisoner grievance system. This is insufficient and inapplicable. Algorithmic risk 
assessment practices require their own processes to challenge.”). 
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the “anchoring effect” of knowing that a seemingly neutral and objective 
algorithm has declared an inmate at a higher likelihood of recidivism 
may give many wardens pause.285  Second, any individual warden may 
be hesitant to approve an early release for fear of negative publicity if 
the inmate does reoffend.  Finally, wardens may introduce their own 
biases into the system through such an override286—biases that 
algorithmic systems are theoretically designed to protect against. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The First Step Act is just that—a first step, one which is necessary 
but not sufficient.  The Act carries with it the opportunity for truly 
meaningful criminal justice reform, and it has made some exciting 
progress.  The PATTERN tool includes certain best practices in 
recidivism prediction, and its developers have made a good faith effort 
to engage advocates and scholars about the tool’s development.  But 
much remains to be done if PATTERN is to truly represent an advance 
in algorithmic recidivism prediction.  The DOJ must release more 
information about PATTERN and its underlying datasets so that 
scholars, advocates, and community members can truly assess the tool 
and offer responses for improving it.   
 
 
 285 For more on “anchoring effect” research with respect to recidivism prediction 
tools, see Liu et al., supra note 32, at 130 (noting that there is a “psychological ‘anchoring 
effect’ for courts using scientific and technological tools,” and that “numerous studies 
have demonstrated how judges (and human individuals) are submissive to computer-
generated numbers and results that may further frame and condition the view of 
judges”); see also Cyphert, supra note 31 (“Laypeople without technical expertise can be 
especially vulnerable to placing too much faith in algorithmic outcomes.”). 
 286 Goel et al., supra note 99, at 15 (“[A]s illustrated by Part I’s discussion of how 
professional ‘overrides’ of actuarial estimates can backfire, it could well reintroduce the 
bias that instruments are designed to prevent.”). 
